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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. All chapters are related to business
cycle issues in the labor market with search frictions. In Chapter 1, I examine the effect
of medical re-evaluations for disability insurance (DI) recipients on the 1981 recession
and its fast recovery. In the US, the recovery in the employment rate of men from the
1981 recession was faster than any other recovery since 1965. During the 1981 recession
and at the beginning of its recovery, the number of disability insurance applicants and
recipients dropped while the numbers increased in all other recessions. This decrease is
attributed to the fact that the most stringent medical re-evaluations for DI recipients
occurred between 1981 and 1983. Medical re-evaluation is a policy that periodically
terminates benefits of ineligible DI recipients. This paper examines the role of medical
re-evaluation in the 1981 recession and its fast recovery. To this end, I build a general
equilibrium business-cycle search and matching model with health, DI and unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) eligibility. Medical re-evaluations affect the number of people who
search for jobs (direct effect) and job-finding probabilities for all unemployed people
(general equilibrium effect). The overall effect of the policy depends on the willingness
of firms to hire workers. The main experiment shows that the change in stringency
of medical re-evaluations during the 1981 recession made the recession deeper and the
recovery faster.
In Chapter 2, my coauthor, John Seliski, and I develop a model with both frictional
labor markets and financial frictions to explore how the dynamics of real and financial
variables are affected by financial shocks. Financial shocks affect the borrowing capacity
of firms in the economy. In particular, we evaluate how important the inclusion of
financial shocks is in accounting for labor market fluctuations by using a standard
RBC matching model as a benchmark. We find that the inclusion of financial frictions
and financial shocks improves a standard matching model’s ability to account for the
observed dynamics of labor market variables. Financial frictions are able to generate
more volatile hours per worker, labor shares, and employment relative to our benchmark
matching model, bringing simulated moments closer to observed fluctuations.
iii
In Chapter 3, I study an alternative mechanism of wage negotiations in an environ-
ment where a firm hires more than one worker and the firm faces diminishing marginal
product of labor (MPL). When Nash bargaining with a marginal worker breaks down,
a firm negotiates wages with existing workers collectively and produces with them.
Due to diminishing MPL, the breakdown of the negotiation with the marginal worker
negatively affects the bargaining position of the firm with existing workers (one fewer
workers) since MPL is higher with one fewer workers. How much the firm internalizes
this negative effect depends on stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers which
can be identified through labor share data. The stochastic bargaining power of exist-
ing workers provides an additional margin to increase the volatility of labor market
variables. In contrast to the prediction of R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), in
which the effect of productivity shocks is dampened when labor share overshoots due
to huge wealth effects from the overshooting property, this paper presents a model in
which the labor share overshoots and the volatility of employment closely matches that
of US data.
iv
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Medical
Re-evaluations for Disability
Insurance Recipients on
Aggregate Employment
Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
In the US, the recovery in the employment rate of men from the 1981 recession was faster
than any other recovery since 1965. During the 1981 recession and at the beginning of
its recovery, the number of disability insurance (DI) applicants and recipients dropped
while the numbers increased in all other recessions. This decrease is attributed to the
fact that the most stringent medical re-evaluations for DI recipients occurred between
1981 and 1983. Medical re-evaluation is a policy that periodically terminates the benefits
of ineligible DI recipients. This paper examines the role of medical re-evaluation1 for
DI recipients in the 1981 recession and its fast recovery.
Based on the abovementioned facts, I build a general equilibrium business-cycle
1 It is called the Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) in reality.
1
2search and matching model with health (in terms of work limitation), DI, and unem-
ployment insurance (UI) eligibility to quantify the effect of medical re-evaluations on the
1981 recession and its recovery. In the model, after receiving health shocks, risk-neutral
employed people can quit their jobs in order to apply for DI. Unemployed people first
decide whether to apply for DI, and then, choose whether to search for jobs while col-
lecting UI benefits if they are eligible for UI. DI applicants2 must wait for five months
until the acceptance decision is made. During this period, they can also search for jobs
if they want, and collect UI benefits. They can be accepted for DI with some probability
and, if accepted, start to collect DI benefits and do not search for jobs. DI recipients
receive medical re-evaluations every period with some probability and their benefits can
be terminated with some probability. Each firm hires only one worker. Workers who
have different productivity compete in the same labor market and firms do not know
who will be matched with them when they post vacancies. Therefore, a firm decides
whether to post a vacancy based on the expected value of posting a vacancy, which
depends on the distribution of unemployed people. Worker flows into and out of the
DI program affect the distribution of unemployed people. In turn, it affects a firm’s
decision to post a vacancy and job finding probabilities. Lastly, after meeting work-
ers, firms immediately learn the worker’s productivity and health status, and wages are
determined by Nash bargaining based on this information.
The model is calibrated to match key features of the US economy, including a distri-
bution of health status among employed people, unemployed people, and DI recipients.
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Current Population Survey (CPS),
and public Social Security Administration (SSA) data in the calibration. A key feature
of computation is that the model has aggregate productivity shocks and heterogeneous
workers are randomly matched in the same labor market. Therefore, the measure of
unemployed people is one of the aggregate state variables. Krusell-Smith (1998) ap-
proximation is used to solve for the model outside of the steady state. In this paper, the
measure of unemployed people is replaced with the total number of employed people.
More stringent medical re-evaluation induces more people to look for jobs (direct
effect) because more DI recipients are terminated and start to look for jobs while less
people apply for DI. If job-finding probabilities are fixed, then the direct effect will
2 People who have applied for DI
3increase the employment rate. However, the increase in the number of people who look
for jobs results in changes in job-finding probabilities for all unemployed people (general
equilibrium effect). Whether job-finding probabilities decrease or increase depends on
how much firms want to hire workers and on the state of the economy. A firm’s decision
to post a vacancy depends on the following two effects. If more people look for jobs,
then it is easier for firms to find workers. This increases a firm’s incentive to post a
vacancy. On the other hand, DI recipients are more likely to have lower productivity.
Therefore, the inflow of terminated DI recipients into the unemployment pool increases
the probability of firms meeting less productive workers. In sum, when more people look
for jobs due to more stringent medical re-evaluations, firms face a trade-off between a
higher probability of finding workers and a lower probability of meeting more produc-
tive workers. So, it is ambiguous whether a firm will post a vacancy. Consequently,
the general equilibrium effect which is the change in job finding probabilities is also
ambiguous. The overall effect of the change in stringency of the policy on employment
rate will be determined by the direct effect and the general equilibrium effects.
To determine the effect of the policy change during the 1981 recession, I perform
an experiment which is similar to what happened during the 1981 recession. This is
an unexpected one-time increase in the frequency3 of medical re-evaluations during a
recession. The experiment shows that more frequent medical re-evaluations during the
1981 recession made the recession deeper and the recovery faster. During the recession,
since more DI recipients are terminated, more people look for jobs. However, firms do
not want to hire workers during a recession. More importantly, since DI recipients are
more likely to have lower productivity, the inflow of terminated DI recipients into the
unemployment pool lowers the expected value of hiring workers. Therefore, a firm’s
incentive to post a vacancy further decreases. In sum, during the recession, the effect
of the drop in job-finding probabilities dominates the effect of the increase in the num-
ber of people who look for jobs. Therefore, the recession becomes deeper compared
to the recession where no change in the frequency of the policy occurs. However, as
the economy recovers, job-finding probabilities start to increase because more jobs are
posted. Consequently, the effect of the increase in the number of people who look for
3 It is measured as a proportion of DI recipients who received medical re-evaluations in the given
year. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a probability of receiving medical re-evaluations.
4jobs outweighs the effect of job-finding probabilities, which accelerates the recovery.
This paper makes several contributions in terms of documentation of facts, model,
and quantitative analysis. I document three facts from the U.S. data. First, I show that
the recovery in the employment of men from the 1981 recession was faster than any other
recovery since 1965. In literature, recoveries before 1990 are considered faster than those
after 1990. However, when I look at the employment rate for men, only the recovery
from the 1981 recession was faster than any other recovery since 1965. In this sense,
the 1981 recession is unique. Second, during the 1981 recession and at the beginning
of its recovery, the number of DI applicants and recipients dropped while the numbers
increased in all other recoveries. This result is attributed to the fact the most stringent
medical re-evaluations occurred between 1981 and 1983. The period 1981-1983 is unique
in the sense that the stringency (in terms of both frequency and tightness4 ) of medical
re-evaluations was significantly higher than that in other periods. The main change
in stringency of the policy during this period was the dramatic increase in frequency,
whereas tightness remained high throughout 1978 to 1983. Third, I provide evidence
on the importance of medical re-evaluations. When the policy became more stringent,
prospective DI applicants were more willing to look for jobs rather than to apply for
DI. Drastic variations in frequency and tightness of medical re-evaluations allow us to
learn the relation between the decisions for DI applications and the stringency of the
policy. Many papers have studied how other DI policies5 affect the behavior of people,
yet the importance of the medical re-evaluation policy has been overlooked.
In terms of model, this paper makes three contributions. First, to the best of
my knowledge, this is the first business-cycle model with DI. Second, in my model,
all unemployed people, including those who do not have any work limitation can be
affected by DI policies through changes in job-finding probabilities (general equilibrium
effect). Although many have used empirical methods or structural life-cycle models to
study the behavior of prospective DI applicants or of rejected DI applicants, no one has
studied the effect of DI policies on people who do not have any work limitation. If the
4 It is measured as a probability that DI benefits were ceased conditional on the medical re-evaluation
5 I can group them into three; 1) a policy that makes DI applicants hard to enter the DI program,
2) a policy that affects the amount of DI benefits, and 3) a policy that makes DI recipients hard to
maintain their eligibility. Most papers focus on the first two policies.
5size of worker flow in and out of the DI program is not negligible, these movements can
affect the job-finding probabilities for all unemployed people who look for jobs in the
same labor market. This mechanism works in my model through general equilibrium
effects. In addition, because DI applications are sensitive to changes in job-finding
probabilities, general equilibrium feedback effects are quantitatively relevant. Third,
every structural model in literature assumes that DI applicants cannot search for jobs,
even though there is no clear evidence for this assumption. The assumption about the
behavior of DI applicants is quantitatively relevant because the incentives and timing of
DI applications are affected by whether or not they can search for jobs while applying
for DI. Therefore, in this paper, DI applicants have an option to search for jobs and
collect UI benefits if they are eligible.
The quantitative contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I examine the role of
medical re-evaluations on the 1981 recession and its fast recovery. No one has studied the
link between the change in DI policies and the fast recovery from the 1981 recession. This
paper examines the effect of the increase in frequency of medical re-evaluations during
the 1981 recession on the recession and its recovery through 1) a direct effect, namely,
an increase in the number of people who look for jobs, and 2) a general equilibrium
effect, namely, a change in job-finding probabilities for all unemployed people. The
experiment shows that more frequent medical re-evaluations during a recession lead to
a deeper recession and a faster recovery.
Second, I use the model to examine the effect of the extended length of time people
collect UI benefits in the presence of DI. Without DI, the extended UI benefits decrease
employment rate. This is because workers look for jobs less intensively6 and firms have
less incentives to hire workers due to higher wages resulting from higher outside options
of workers7 . However, in the presence of DI, the extended UI benefits could increase
employment rates. This is because there is one more important channel in the presence
of DI. The extended UI benefits induces more people to look for jobs by delaying their
DI applications until UI benefits are expired. According to the experiment, the exten-
sion of UI benefits from 26 weeks to 52 weeks leads to a deeper recession and slower
6 See Nakajima (2012)
7 See Hagedorn et al. (2015)
6recovery. This is because the number of people who look for jobs by delaying DI ap-
plications do not increase much while job-finding probabilities remain lower throughout
the recession and recovery. However, if the duration is further extended from 52 weeks
to 99 weeks, unemployed people who have work limitation are more willing to look for
jobs by delaying their DI applications, and this effect dominates the effect of the drop
in job-finding probabilities during the recovery. Therefore, the extended UI benefits
lead to a faster recovery. This result implies that in the presence of DI, the extended
UI benefits during recessions can expedite recoveries if the timing of extension is well
designed considering the state of the economy.
This paper is related to several strands of literature on DI. In terms of policy,
Moore (2014) examines the employment effect of terminated DI recipients after the
1996 removal of drug and alcohol addictions as qualifying conditions, and finds that the
employment effect from the policy change was large. The policy reform in Moore (2014)
is similar to that in my paper in the sense that it terminated a subset of DI recipients
from the DI program. However, Moore (2014) uses empirical methods to study the
employment effect only for terminated DI recipients. In my paper, DI policies affect
all the unemployed, including people who have no work limitation, through a change in
job-finding probabilities. In terms of models with DI, several papers have a structural
life-cycle model with DI and search friction in the labor market for steady state analysis.
Benitez-Silva et al. (2011) study the effect of a policy that induces DI recipients to return
to work. Low and Pistaferri (2012) estimate the disability risks that individuals face
and the parameters governing the DI program. Kitao (2014) and Kim (2014) examine
the role of Medicare in the DI program on the life-cycle labor supply. In aforementioned
papers, job-finding probabilities are fixed because they do not model firms. In contrast,
this paper builds a general equilibrium business-cycle search and matching model with
DI, where DI application decisions are affected by changes in job-finding probabilities
over the business cycle. This paper is also related to literature on the relationship
between UI policies and DI applications. Mueller et al. (2015) identify the effect of UI
exhaustion on DI application and find no evidence that expiration of UI benefits causes
DI applications. Lindner and Nichols (2012) examine whether or not participating
in temporary assistance programs, including UI, influences DI applications, and find
evidence that increased access to UI benefits reduces DI applications. Rutledge (2012)
7empirically investigates the effect of UI extensions on DI applications, and whether UI
eligibility, extension, and exhaustion affect the timing of DI applications. Rutledge
(2012) finds that jobless individuals are significantly less likely to apply for DI during
UI extensions, and significantly more likely to apply when UI is exhausted. My paper
examines the role of extended UI in the presence of DI during a recession with a general
equilibrium model where DI applications are affected by UI policies as well as changes
in job-finding probabilities.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents facts about the 1981 recession,
its fast recovery, and medical re-evaluations. Section 3 describes the model and Section
4 presents the calibration. Section 5 shows the results of quantitative analysis. Lastly,
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Facts
In this section, I document several facts about the 1981 recession, its fast recovery, and
medical re-evaluations.
1.2.1 Fast recovery in the employment rates from the 1981 recession
Figure 1.1: Recessions and recoveries in the employment rate of men since 1965
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(a) Recessions and recoveries
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(b) Recoveries
Note: Figure 1.1 shows percentage point changes in the employment rate of men (age 25-64). All series
are computed from the monthly CPS and they are not filtered.
8In literature, recoveries before 1990 are considered faster than those after 1990.
However, when I look at the employment rate for men, only the recovery from the 1981
recession was faster than any other recovery since 1965. In this sense, the recovery from
the 1981 is unique. Figure 1.1(a) shows percent point changes in the employment rate8
of men9 since NBER peak10 and Figure 1.1(b) shows percent point changes in the
employment rate of men since NBER trough. From Figure 1.1(b) we can clearly see
that the recovery from the 1981 recession was significantly faster than others.
1.2.2 Most stringent medical re-evaluation policy during 1981-1983
Figure 1.2: DI applicants and DI recipients
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(a) DI applicants/Population
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(b) DI recipients/Population
Note: Figure 1.2 shows percentage point changes in DI applicants per population and DI recipients
per population for men. All series are computed from the public Social Security Administration (SSA)
data. Since the SSA do not publish DI application data by sex, DI applications for men are calculated
with a total number of monthly DI applications and a share of men in DI awards each month.
During the 1981 recession and at the beginning of its recovery, the number of DI
applicants and recipients dropped while the numbers increased in all other recoveries as
we can see in Figure 1.2. The period 1981-1983 is unique in the sense that stringency of
8 The definition of the employment rate in this paper is the employment-population ratio.
9 The recovery from the 1981 recession is still fastest when I look at data including women as in
Figure A.1 in Appendix A. The reason why I only look at data for men is that woman’s labor force
participation steadily increased between 1970s and 1980s and I want to control this factor in the analysis.
10 I exclude the 1980 recession because it was shortly followed by the 1981 recession.
9Figure 1.3: Three measures for stringency of medical re-evaluations
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
Years
Pe
rc
en
t (%
)
 
 
A propotion of DI recipients who received med. re−evals.
(a) Frequency
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Years
Pe
rc
en
t (%
)
 
 
Benefit cessation rates given med. re−evals.
(b) Tightness
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Years
Pe
rc
en
t (%
)
 
 
A propotion of DI recipients whose benefit was ceased
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Note: Figure 1.3 shows three measures of stringency of medical re-evaluations. They are calculated
with the data from Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports (1997) and Annual Report of
Continuing Disability Review (2011).
medical re-evaluations was significantly higher than that in other periods. I define three
different measures for stringency of medical re-evaluations. Figure 1.3(a) shows the
frequency of medical re-evaluations, which is measured as a proportion of DI recipients
who received medical re-evaluations in the given year. The annual frequency increased
from 4.9% in 1980 to 20.4% in 1983 mainly due to the Social Security Disability Amend-
ments of 1980. Before the amendments, medical re-evaluations were conducted only for
selected DI recipients whose medical condition was expected to be improved. However,
after the amendments, the Congress required SSA to conduct medical re-evaluations on
all DI recipients at least once every three years except for DI recipients expected to be
permanently disabled. Therefore, during 1981-1983 approximately 1.2 million medical
re-evaluations were conducted and benefits of 0.5 million recipients were ceased11 .
This stringent medical re-evaluations led to public outcry which resulted in a nation-
wide moratorium on medical re-evaluations during 1983-1984 and the Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform of 1984. In 1985, medical re-evaluations resumed on a grad-
ual basis, employing the new medical improvement review standard mandated by the
Congress in the 1984 Amendments. However, the frequency of medical re-evaluation
varied based on budget availability afterward. Figure 1.3(b) shows the tightness of
medical re-evaluations, which is measured as a probability that DI benefits were ceased
conditional on the medical re-evaluation. The tightness was highest throughout 1978 to
11 Those numbers include both men and women.
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1983. After the reform in 1984, tightness significantly dropped from 41% in 1983 to 11%
in 1985 because the newly introduced medical review standard made SSA harder termi-
nate the benefits of DI recipients. Finally, Figure 1.3(c) shows both the frequency and
tightness of medical re-evaluations, which is measured as a a proportion of DI recipients
whose benefit was ceased by the medical re-evaluation. We can see a big spike during
1981-1983, which shows the most stringent medical re-evaluations occurred during this
period. The main change in stringency of the policy during this period was the dramatic
increase in frequency, whereas tightness remained high throughout 1978 to 1983.
1.2.3 Importance of medical re-evaluations
Table 1.1: Correlations between stringency of medical re-evaluations and behavior of
the unemployed
1994-2006 (excluding recessions) U w/ work limitation U w/o work limitation
Corr(stringency, DI applications/pop) -0.51
Corr(stringency, Pr[U→E]) 0.47 -0.02
Note: Stringency of medical re-evaluations denotes the third measure of stringency in Figure 1.3(c).
DI applications are computed from the public SSA data. Transition probabilities from the unemployed
to the employed by health status (self-reported work limitation) are calculated from the March CPS
(men, 25-64). I choose the period 1994-2006 because there were major changes in the CPS in 1994. I
exclude the recession periods because DI applications and the transition probabilities are sensitive to
the recessions. However, when we include the recession periods, the signs and magnitudes are similar
to the numbers in Table 1.1. I am working on the same table with the PSID so that I can use samples
before 1994.
Many papers have studied how other DI policies12 affect the behavior of people, yet
the importance of the medical re-evaluation policy has been overlooked. I document that
when the policy became more stringent, prospective DI applicants were more willing to
look for jobs rather than to apply for DI. Drastic variations in frequency and tightness
of medical re-evaluations allow us to learn the relation between the decisions for DI
application and the stringency of the policy. Table 1.1 shows correlations between
stringency of medical re-evaluations and behavior of prospective DI applicants and of the
12 I can group them into three; 1) a policy that makes DI applicants hard to enter the DI program,
2) a policy that affects the amount of DI benefits, and 3) a policy that makes DI recipients hard to
maintain their eligibility. Most papers focus on the first two policies.
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unemployed. The correlation between the stringency of the policy and DI application per
population is -0.51. The correlation between the policy and the transition probabilities
from the unemployed to the employed for the unemployed who have work limitation is
0.47 whereas the correlation for the unemployed who have no work limitation is almost
zero. This implies when the medical re-evaluations became more stringent, prospective
DI applicants were more willing to look for jobs rather than to apply for DI.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Environment
The model period is assumed to be a month. The economy consists of a continuum
of risk-neutral workers and firms. The total measure of workers is normalized to one.
Workers have an ex-ante heterogeneous individual productivity x ∈ [x, x] which does
not change over time. At the beginning of each period, workers receive a health shock
(in terms of work limitation) γ. After receiving a health shock, employed people can
quit in order to apply for DI. Unemployed people decide whether to apply for disability
insurance (DI), and then choose whether to search for jobs while collecting unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) benefits bU if they are eligible. DI applicants13 must wait for 5
months until the acceptance decision is made. During this period, they can also search
for jobs if they want, and collect UI benefits14 . They can be accepted with probability
pia (γ) which depends on the level of work limitation and if they are accepted they start
to collect DI benefits bD and do not search for jobs. At the beginning of each period, DI
recipients can voluntarily leave the program to find jobs and if they choose to stay, at
the end of the period they receive medical re-evaluations with probability pir
15 and their
DI benefits can be terminated with probability pit (γ). Each firm hires only one worker
and firms do not know the worker’s individual productivity and health status until they
13 People who have applied for DI
14 In reality, if DI applicants collect UI benefits, it might lower the probability of being accepted to
the DI program. In the current version of the model, I assume that collecting UI benefits during the
5-month waiting period does not affect the probability of being accepted to the DI program.
15 For more appropriate analysis, I should make the probability of receiving medical re-evaluations
depend on the health status when DI recipients were accepted to the DI program as in reality. I can
model it, but it is not easy to pin down these parameters due to lack of data. For this reason, I assume
that this probability is the same for every DI recipient, but this assumption can be relaxed if I find
proper targets later.
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meet. Therefore, search is random in the sense that all types of workers compete in the
same labor market and wages are determined by Nash Bargaining. I assume that wages
does not depend on a worker’s DI application status a, and months after DI application
m for simplicity. The number of new matches is determined by the matching function
M = M(U, V ). I can define the market tightness θ ≡ VU , job-finding probability for
workers p (θ) ≡ M(U,V )U , and job-filling probability for firms q (θ) ≡ M(U,V )V . Firms can
enter the market by posting a vacancy at the cost of κ.
1.3.2 Timing of the model
1. Aggregate labor productivity shocks and health shocks are realized
2. A worker’s decision is made:
- The employed decide to quit
- The unemployed decide whether to apply for DI, then choose whether to search
for jobs
- DI recipients decide whether to leave the DI program to find jobs
3. Production takes place and vacancies are posted / search and matching occurs
4. DI acceptance decision is made and DI recipients are terminated through medical
re-evaluations
5. The employed are exogenously separated
1.3.3 Worker’s problem
The individual states of a worker are represented by (l, γ, a,m, e). l ∈ {E,U,D} repre-
sents labor force status which includes the employed (E), the unemployed (U), and DI
recipients (D) who are not in the labor force. γ ∈ {γn, γm, γs} denotes the level of work
limitation which lowers the individual productivity of the worker by γ. γn, γm, and
γs denote no work limitation, moderate work limitation, and severe work limitation,
respectively. Since DI applicants must wait for 5 months until the acceptance decision
is made, I should keep track of DI application status a ∈ {0, 1} , and months after DI
application m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Lastly, e ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a worker is eligible
for UI benefits or not.
The aggregate states of the economy are represented by (z, ψ) where z is an aggregate
labor productivity and ψ is a measure of workers. Workers and firms should keep track
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of the measure of workers ψ because heterogeneous workers search for jobs in the same
market and they are randomly matched to firms, which makes the job-finding probability
p (θ (z, ψ)) and job-filling probability q (θ (z, ψ)) depend on the measure of workers ψ as
well as on the aggregate labor productivity z.
Since workers have a different individual productivity x, every value function is
indexed by x.
Employed workers: Employed workers can quit in order to apply for DI at the
beginning of each period.
W x (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = max
[
W xc (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
work
,W x (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
quit
]
If they choose to work, they can be exogenously separated with probability χ at the
end of the period and become unemployed. The stochastic process of the level of work
limitation γ is governed by a transition probability matrix Πγ . The employed without
UI eligibility stochastically become eligible and the stochastic process is governed by a
transition probability matrix ΠeE . Wages depend on the individual productivity x, the
level of work limitation γ, and UI eligibility e, which will be described later more in
detail in the calibration section. I assume disutility from labor force participation cp (γ)
for the employed and the unemployed who search for jobs.
W xc (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = w
x (γ, e, θ (z, ψ))− cp (γ)
(not separated) + βEz,γ,e
[
(1− χ)W x
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
(separated) + χW x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ), e
′
= ΠeE(e)
Unemployed workers: Unemployed workers decide whether to apply for DI at an
application cost of ca at the beginning of the period.
W x (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = max
[
W xc (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not apply
,−ca +W xa (U, γ, 1, 1, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
apply for DI
]
Once they made the decision for DI application, they choose whether to search for jobs.
1) Unemployed workers who have not applied for DI
W xc (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = max
[
W xc,ns (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not search
,W xc,s (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
search
]
If they do not search, then they just wait for one month.
W xc,ns (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = βEz,γ,e
[
W x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
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If they search for jobs, they collect UI benefits bU if they are eligible even while applying
for DI. If they find a job at the end of the period, they become employed. Otherwise,
they remain unemployed. The unemployed with UI eligibility stochastically loose their
eligibility and the stochastic process is governed by a transition probability matrix ΠeU .
I(e=1) is an indicator function which has 1 if they are eligible for UI benefits.
W xc,s (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = b
U (x, γ) I(e=1) − cp (γ)
(find a job) + βEz,γ,e
[
p (θ (z, ψ))W x
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
(not find a job) + (1− p (θ (z, ψ)))W x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ), e
′
= ΠeU (e)
2) Unemployed workers who have applied for DI
W xa (U, γ, 1,m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , e; z, ψ) = max
[
W xa,ns (U, γ, 1,m, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not search
,W xa,s (U, γ, 1,m, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
search
]
Before the 5th month of DI application, if they do not search, they just wait for one
month as DI applicants.
W xa,ns (U, γ, 1,m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , e; z, ψ) = βEz,γ,e
[
W xa
(
U, γ
′
, 1,m+ 1, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
At the 5th month of DI application, if they are accepted, they become DI recipients.
Otherwise, they remain unemployed.
W xa,ns (U, γ, 1,m = 5, e; z, ψ) =
(accepted) βEz,γ
[
pia (γ)W
x
(
D, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
(not accepted) + (1− pia (γ))W x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
Before the 5th month of DI application, if they search and find a job at the end of the
period, they become employed or keep waiting for the decision. Otherwise, they remain
DI applicants.
W xa,s (U, γ, 1,m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , e; z, ψ) = bU (x, γ) I(e=1) − cp (γ)
(find a job) + βE
[
p (θ (z, ψ)) max
[
W x
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
,
W xa
(
U, γ
′
, 1,m+ 1, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
(not find a job) + (1− p (θ (z, ψ)))W xa
(
U, γ
′
, 1,m+ 1, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ),
e
′
= ΠeU (e)
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At the 5th month of DI application, if they are accepted and find a job at the same
time, they choose whether to become employed or DI recipients. If they are accepted
but they do not get a job, they become DI recipients. If they are not accepted but find
a job, they become employed. Lastly, if they are not accepted and do not find a job,
they remain unemployed.
W xa,s (U, γ, 1, 5, e; z, ψ) = b
U (x, γ) I(e=1) − cp (γ)
(accepted & find a job) + βE
[
pia (γ) p (θ (z, ψ)) max
[
W x
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
,
, W x
(
D, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
(accepted & not find a job) + pia (γ) (1− p (θ (z, ψ)))W x
(
D, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
(not accepted & find a job) + (1− pia (γ)) p (θ (z, ψ))W x
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
(not accepted & not find a job) + (1− pia (γ)) (1− p (θ (z, ψ)))W x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ), e
′
= ΠeU (e)
DI recipients: DI recipients decide whether to stay in the DI program or voluntarily
leave it to find jobs at the beginning of the period.
W x (D, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) = max
[
W xc (D, γ, 0, 0, 0; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stay inDI
,W x (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
leaveDI
]
If they choose to stay, they do not search for jobs while collecting DI benefits bD.
At the end of the period, they receive medical re-evaluations with probability pir ,
and conditional on the medical re-evaluation, their benefit can be terminated with
probability pit (γ). Once they start to collect DI benefits, they loose their UI eligibility
with probability 1.
W xc (D, γ, 0, 0, 0; z, ψ) = b
D (x)
(terminated) + βEz,γ
[
pirpit (γ)W
x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, 0; z
′
, ψ
′)
(not terminated) + (1− pirpit (γ))W x
(
D, γ
′
, 0, 0, 0; z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ)
If they choose to leave the program, they become unemployed.
1.3.4 Firm’s problem
The individual states of a firm are represented by (γ, e) and the aggregate states are
represented by (z, ψ). Each firm hires only one worker. Firms do not know the worker’s
individual productivity and the level of work limitation until they meet.
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Firms matched with (x, γ, e)-type workers: At the end of the period, a worker
can be exogenously separated or endogenously separated by quitting. Firms take the
worker’s decision for quitting s′ as given. If the worker is separated, the firm becomes
unmatched.
Jx (γ, e; z, ψ) = zx (1− γ)− wx (γ, e, θ (z, ψ))
(not separated) + βE
[
(1− χ)
(
1− s′
)
Jx
(
γ
′
, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
(separated) +
(
1− (1− χ)
(
1− s′
))
V
(
z
′
, ψ
′)]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ), e
′
= ΠeE(e)
s
′
= gxq
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
=
1 if W
x
c
(
E, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
< W x
(
U, γ
′
, 0, 0, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)
0 if otherwise
Unmatched firms: Since firms do not know the worker’s individual productivity x
and the level of work limitation γ, they have to take into account a type distribution of
the unemployed who search for jobs when they decide to enter the market.
V (z, ψ) = −κ
(matched) + β [q (θ (z, ψ))
∫
Ez,γ,e
[(
1− s′
)
Jx
(
γ
′
, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]×
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e)∫
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
(not matched) + (1− q (θ (z, ψ)))Ez
[
V
(
z
′
, ψ
′)]]
s.t.
log z
′
= ρ log z + ε
′
, ψ
′
= T (z, ψ) , γ
′
= Πγ(γ), e
′
= ΠeU (e)
gxs (U, γ, a,m, e; z, ψ) is a decision rule for searching for jobs
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) = I(gxs (U,γ,a,m,e;z,ψ)=1)ψ (x, U, γ, a,m, e)
Free entry condition: With the free entry condition V (z, ψ) = 0, we have
κ = βq (θ (z, ψ))
∫
Ez,γ,e
[(
1− s′
)
Jx
(
γ
′
, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]×
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e)∫
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
where ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) = I(gxs (U,γ,a,m,e;z,ψ)=1)ψ (x, U, γ, a,m, e)
Note that the market tightness θ (z, ψ) depends on the measure of workers ψ as well
as on the aggregate labor productivity z.
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1.3.5 Nash bargained wages
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining problem.
wx (γ, e, θ (z, ψ)) = argmax
w
(W xc (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)−W x (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ))µ (Jx (γ, e; z, ψ))1−µ
Or equivalently,
wx (γ, e, θ (z, ψ)) s.t. (1− µ) (W xc (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)−W x (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ)) = µ (Jx (γ, e; z, ψ))
I assume that wages do not depend on a worker’s DI application status a, and months
after DI application m for simplicity. µ denotes the bargaining power of workers.
1.3.6 Equilibrium
Definition (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium): A recursive competitive equi-
librium is a set of value functions for workers W x (l, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) ,W xc (l, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) ,
W xc,ns (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) ,W
x
c,s (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) ,W
x
a,ns (U, γ, a,m, e; z, ψ) ,
W xa,s (U, γ, a,m, e; z, ψ) ,value functions for firms, J
x (γ, e; z, ψ) ,V (z, ψ), decision rules
for quitting gxq (E, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) ,applying for DI g
x
a (U, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) , searching for jobs
gxs (U, γ, a,m, e; z, ψ) , leaving the DI program g
x
l (D, γ, 0, 0, e; z, ψ) , the market tight-
ness θ (z, ψ), wages wx (γ, e, θ (z, ψ)), and a law of motion for the measure ψ
′
= T (z, ψ)
such that:
1. Given the market tightness and wages, decision rules for workers solve the worker’s
problems.
2. The market tightness is consistent with the free entry condition.
3. Wages are the solutions to the Nash bargaining problem.
4. The law of motion for the measure is consistent with optimal decision rules and
stochastic processes of z, γ, and e.
1.4 Calibration
I assume the following matching function, a variant of Haan et al. (2000)
M (u, v) = φ1
uv
(uφ2 + vφ2)
1/φ2
I put an additional scale parameter φ1 as in Wiczer (2014) because without the scale
parameter it is difficult to match both the level of the job-finding probability and the
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elasticity of job-finding probabilities with respect to the market tightness in data. The
transition probability matrix of UI eligibility for the employed ΠeE and the unemployed
ΠeU are assumed to be
ΠeE =
[
1− pi0,1E pi0,1E
0 1
]
, ΠeU =
[
1 0
pi1,0U 1− pi1,0U
]
The employed without UI eligibility stochastically become eligible with probability pi0,1E
and the unemployed with UI eligibility stochastically lose their eligibility with proba-
bility pi1,0U .
1.4.1 Predetermined parameters
Table 1.2: Predetermined parameters
Parameter Description Value Remark
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate = 4%
µ Bargaining power of workers 0.50
φ2 Elasticity param. in the matching function 1.6 Schaal (2012)
pi1,0U Prob. of losing UI eligibility for U 0.1538 Duration of UI: 26 weeks
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pia (γn) Prob. of acceptance for no WL 0.00
ρ Persistence of aggregate labor prod. 0.97 Hagedorn & Manovskii (2011)
σ Standard dev. of aggregate labor prod. 0.006 Hagedorn & Manovskii (2011)
I choose a monthly discount factor β of 0.9967 which implies that the annualized
interest rate is 4%. The bargaining power of workers is set at 0.50. The elasticity
parameter in the matching function is set at 1.6 as in Schaal (2012). The probability of
losing UI eligibility for the unemployed is set at 0.1583 which implies that the average
length of time people collect UI benefits is 26 weeks. I assume that workers who do not
have work limitation cannot be accepted to the DI program. I use the same shock process
for the aggregate labor productivity as that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011). The
amount of unemployment benefits bU (x, γ) is determined by the following equation.
bU (x, γ) = 0.40× wx (γ, 1, θ)
The replacement rate of UI benefits is set at 0.40 as in Shimer (2005) and the steady
state wage w
(
x, γ, 1, θ
)
is used when I calculate the benefits. DI benefits bD (x) is
calculated by the same formula as the Social Security benefits. First, I need to compute
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) which is the average of past highest
earnings up to 35 years. Since the model does not have a life-cycle structure, I assume
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that the AIME can be approximated by the steady state wage for people who do not
have work limitation and have UI eligibility, which is the highest wage among x-type
workers in the model
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) ≡ wx (γn, 1, θ)
Based on the AIME, I compute the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) by the following
formula.
PIA =

0.9×AIME if AIME ≤ $316.25
$284.63 + 0.32× (AIME− $316.25) if $316.25 < AIME ≤ $1905.50
$793.19 + 0.15× (AIME− $1905.50) if $1905.05 < AIME
I use the bend points in 1986 because every nominal wage in the calibration is discounted
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) given the base year 1986. Finally, the PIA is capped
by the maximum amount of benefits which depends on the PIA. I also use the bend
points in 1986.
Max of benefits =

1.5× PIA if PIA ≤ $403.75
$605.63 + 2.72× (PIA− $403.75) if $403.75 < PIA ≤ $583.25
$1093.87 + 1.34× (PIA− $583.25) if $583.25 < PIA ≤ $760.50
$1331.38 + 1.75× (PIA− $760.50) if $760.50 < PIA
Therefore, the DI benefits bD (x) in this paper can be expressed by
bD (x) = min [PIA, Max of benefits]
Figure 1.4 summarizes the relation between the AIME and DI benefits in the model.
1.4.2 Parameters estimated outside of the model
I define a discrete variable for health status (the level of work limitation) following Low
and Pistaferri (2012). In the PSID, people are asked three different questions about
their work limitation:
1. Do you have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the
amount of work you can do? (possible answers: yes / no)
: If the answer is yes, then interviewer asks the second question.
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Figure 1.4: Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) and DI benefits in the model
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2. Does this condition keep you from doing some types of work? (possible answers:
yes / no / can do nothing)
: If the answer is yes or no, then interviewer asks the third question.
3. For what work you can do, how much does it limit the amount of work you can
do? (possible answers: a lot / somewhat / just a little / not at all)
Table 1.3 shows how I define the level of work limitation based on the three questions
above.
Table 1.3: Definition of the level of work limitation
Ans. to the 1st Q. Ans. to the 2nd Q. Ans. to the 3rd Q.
No work limitation
No - -
Yes Yes / no Not at all
Moderate work limitation Yes Yes / no Somewhat / just a little
Severe work limitation
Yes Can do nothing -
Yes Yes / no A lot
The monthly transition matrix for health status is estimated from the PSID by using
the discrete variable for work limitation in Table 1.3. Given the assumption that a shock
process for work limitation is stable throughout a year, an annual transition matrix ΠγA
can be directly estimated from the PSID for 1986-199217 . Once the annual transition
17 Data for DI recipients along with other variables are only available for this period.
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matrix is estimated, it can be converted to the monthly transition matrix Πγ such that
(Πγ)12 = ΠγA. Table 1.4 represents the estimated monthly transition matrix Π
γ .
Table 1.4: Monthly transition matrix for health status
No work lim. Moderate work lim. Severe work lim.
No work limitation 0.995 0.004 0.001
Moderate work limitation 0.048 0.935 0.017
Severe work limitation 0.015 0.031 0.954
1.4.3 Parameters calibrated in the model
17 remaining parameters are calibrated to match key features of the US economy for
1986-1992 by using 17 targets. 11 parameters among 17 parameters are related to health
and the DI program: the penalty rate of productivity with moderate work limitation γm
and severe work limitation γs, probability of acceptance for moderate work limitation
pia (γm) and severe work limitation pia (γs), probability of termination given medical re-
evaluation for no work limitation pit (γn), moderate work limitation pit (γm), and severe
work limitation pit (γs), disutility from labor force participation for no work limitation
cp (γn), moderate work limitation cp (γm), severe work limitation cp (γs), and DI ap-
plication cost ca. 6 remaining parameters are related to the labor market: exogenous
separation rate χ, a minimum value of individual productivity x, a maximum value
of individual productivity x, the scale parameter in the matching function φ1, cost of
posting vacancies κ, and probability of getting UI eligibility for the employed pi0,1E .
Targets
Table 1.5: Distribution of labor force status (2 targets)
Employed/Population Unemployed/Population DI recipients/Population Sum
0.917 0.049 0.034∗ 1
Note: table 5 shows a distribution of labor force status for 1986-1992. The numbers of the employed,
the unemployed, and population are calculated from the monthly CPS (men, 25-64). The number of
DI recipients is calculated from the public SSA data. *: it is not used because the distribution of labor
force status adds up to one.
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Table 1.6: Distribution of health status by labor force status (6 targets)
No work lim. Moderate work lim. Severe work lim. Sum
Employed 0.935 0.055 0.010∗ 1
Unemployed 0.775 0.185 0.040∗ 1
DI recipients 0.148 0.189 0.663∗ 1
Note: table 6 shows distribution of health status by labor force status for 1986-1992. The numbers are
calculated from the PSID (men, 25-64). *: they are not used because the distribution of health status
given a specific labor force status adds up to one.
First, I use a distribution of labor force status (Table 1.5) and a distribution of health
status among the employed, the unemployed, and DI recipients (Table 1.6). Table 1.7
shows the rest of targets.
Table 1.7: Other targets (9 targets)
Target Value Remark
New DI applicants/P×100 0.109 SSA, 1986:Q1-1992:Q4
Average prob. of termination given med. re-evals. 0.106 SSA, 1986:Q1-1992:Q4
Rate of wage drops with moderate work lim. 0.251 PSID, 1986-1992
Rate of wage drops with severe work lim. 0.450 PSID, 1986-1992
5 percentile of monthly wages 641 PSID, 1986-1992
95 percentile of monthly wages 5866 PSID, 1986-1992
Average job-finding probability 0.430 Shimer’s data, 1986:Q1-1992:Q4
Elasticity of job-finding prob. w.r.t. the tightness 0.300 Shimer (2007)
Share of the unemployed who receive UI benefits 0.362 Nakajima (2012)
Note: the average job-finding probability is computed with the data constructed by Robert Shimer as
part of Shimer (2012)
The number of new DI applications per population is used to pin down the DI appli-
cation cost. The penalty rates of productivity with work limitations can be determined
by wage differences between people who have no work limitation and people who have
work limitation. In order to pin down the minimum and maximum values of individual
productivity, I use the 5 percentile of monthly wages and 95 percentile of monthly wages
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from the annual wages in the PSID. The average job-finding probability and the elas-
ticity of job-finding probabilities with respect to the market tightness are used to pin
down the scale parameter in the matching function and the cost of posting vacancies.
Calibrated parameters
Table 1.8 summarizes 17 calibrated parameters and Table 1.9 represents moments from
data and the model. The model successfully matches most of the targets, but the
distributions of health status by labor force status are relatively difficult to match.
Table 1.8: 17 parameters calibrated in the model
Parameter Description Calibrated value
γm Penalty rate of productivity with moderate work lim. 0.282
γs Penalty rate of productivity with severe work lim. 0.645
pia (γm) Prob. of acceptance for moderate work lim 0.150
pia (γs) Prob. of acceptance for severe work lim. 0.810
pit (γn) Prob. of termination given med. re-evals. for no work lim. 0.420
pit (γm) Prob. of termination given med. re-evals. for moderate work lim. 0.180
pit (γs) Prob. of termination given med. re-evals. for severe work lim. 0.010
cp (γn) Disutility from labor force participation for no work lim. 1032
cp (γm) Disutility from labor force participation for moderate work lim. 1210
cp (γs) Disutility from labor force participation for severe work lim. 1425
ca DI application cost 1950
χ Exogenous separation rate 0.017
x Minimum value of individual productivities 2070
x Maximum value of individual productivities 6130
φ1 Scale parameter in the matching function 0.538
κ Cost of posting vacancies 2113
pi0,1E Prob. of getting UI eligibility for the employed 0.006
1.5 Quantitative results
1.5.1 Steady state equilibrium
In this section, I compare main statistics in the steady states under different DI and UI
policies.
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Table 1.9: Calibration results: data vs. model
Target Data Model
Employed/Population 0.917 0.918
Unemployed/Population 0.049 0.049
New DI applicants/P×100 0.109 0.118
Proportion of no work lim. among the employed 0.935 0.929
Proportion of moderate work lim. among the employed 0.055 0.064
Proportion of no work lim. among the unemployed 0.775 0.737
Proportion of moderate work lim. among the unemployed 0.185 0.134
Proportion of no work lim. among DI recipients 0.148 0.150
Proportion of moderate work lim. among DI recipients 0.189 0.210
Average prob. of termination given med. re-evals. 0.106 0.107
Rate of wage drops with moderate work lim. 0.251 0.249
Rate of wage drops with severe work lim. 0.450 0.449
5 percentile of monthly wages 641 708
95 percentile of monthly wages 5866 5870
Average job-finding probability 0.430 0.430
Elasticity of job-finding prob. w.r.t. the tightness 0.300 0.302
Share of the unemployed who receive UI benefits 0.362 0.361
Comparison of statistics: more stringent DI policies
Table 1.10 compares main statistics in the steady states under 5 different DI policies.
1. Baseline (1986-1992)
2. Tighter medical re-evaluations
3. Tighter and more frequent medical re-evaluations
4. Lower probability of acceptance
5. Less amount of DI benefits
In general, more stringent DI policies result in less DI recipients and higher employment
rates. However, the results for the number of DI applications are not trivial. The lower
probability of acceptance and less amount of DI benefits induce less people to apply
for DI. In contrast, under more stringent medical re-evaluations, ironically more people
apply for DI. When the medical re-evaluations become more stringent, workers have
less incentives to apply for DI because of higher termination risks from the DI program.
However, higher terminations from the DI program increase the number of unemployed
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people and the number of prospective DI applicants. The overall effect will depend
on the magnitude of these conflicting effects. Given the calibration, when medical re-
evaluations become more stringent, the latter effect dominates the former effect in the
steady state. Consequently, slightly more people apply for DI whereas the number of
DI recipients drops due to higher outflows from the DI program.
Table 1.10: Statistics in the steady states: more stringent DI policies
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aver. prob. of acceptance 73.3% 73.3% 73.3% 58.7%18 73.3%
Frequency of med. re-evals. 0.48%19 0.48% 1.61% 0.48% 0.48%
Aver. tightness of med. re-evals. 10.00% 44.00% 44.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Amount of DI benefits - - - - 20% ↓
Employed/Population 0.9184 0.9206 0.9239 0.9203 0.9262
Unemployed/Population 0.0491 0.0496 0.0495 0.0492 0.0481
DI recipient/Population 0.0324 0.0298 0.0266 0.0305 0.0258
New DI applicant/Population×100 0.1181 0.1188 0.1200 0.1153 0.1172
Job-finding probability 0.4296 0.4294 0.4292 0.4295 0.4291
Vacancies×100 6.6916 6.7050 6.7152 6.6802 6.7086
Average monthly wages ($ in 1986) 3498 3494 3488 3495 3485
Cutoff productivity for DI applications
Figure 1.5 shows cutoff productivity for DI application in the steady state when the
tightness is 44%20 . In the steady state, only unemployed people who have severe work
limitation apply for DI. Whether or not the unemployed are eligible for UI benefits is
important for DI applications. People who are not eligible for UI benefits are more
likely to apply for DI. Figure 1.5(b) shows how cutoff productivity changes as the
aggregate labor productivity changes. As productivity drops, more people apply for
DI. In particular, people who have moderate work limitation start to apply for DI.
20 I will use this economy in the main experiment in this paper
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Figure 1.5: Cutoff productivity for DI applications
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
5150
5200
5250
5300
5350
5400
5450
5500
In
di
vid
ua
l p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
 (x
)
Probability of receiving medical re−evaluations (monthly)
 
 
Severe work limitation (w/o UI)
Severe work limitation (w UI)
(a) Frequency of medical re-evaluations
0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
In
di
vid
ua
l p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
 (x
)
Aggregate labor producivity 
 
 
Severe work limitation (w/o UI)
Severe work limitation (w UI)
Moderate work limitation
No work limitation
(b) Aggregate labor productivity
Comparison of statistics: more generous UI policies
Table 1.11: Statistics in the steady states: more generous UI policies
Variables (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Prob. of losing UI eligibility 26 (weeks)21 26 26 5222 9923
Replacement rate 40% 50% 60% 40% 40%
Employed/Population 0.9184 0.9289 0.9128 0.9172 0.9248
Unemployed/Population 0.0491 0.0452 0.0611 0.0503 0.0478
DI recipient/Population 0.0324 0.0260 0.0261 0.0325 0.0238
DI applicant/Population×100 0.1181 0.1071 0.1067 0.1188 0.0949
Monthly Job-finding rate 0.4296 0.4279 0.3994 0.4232 0.4120
Vacancies×100 6.6916 6.5901 7.4640 6.4843 6.0869
Average monthly wages ($ in 1986) 3498 3482 3479 3506 3494
Table 1.11 compares main statistics in the steady states under 5 different UI policies.
1. Baseline (1986-1992)
2. More amount of DI benefits (replacement rate: 50%)
3. More amount of DI benefits (replacement rate: 60%)
4. Longer length of time people collect UI benefits (52 weeks)
5. Longer length of time people collect UI benefits (99 weeks)
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More generous UI policies give us non-trivial results for the employment rate. For
example, the employment rate of the economy where the replacement rate is 50%, is
higher than that of the baseline economy (40%). However, the employment rate of the
economy where the replacement rate is 60%, is lower than that of the baseline economy.
More generous UI policies affect the employment rate in two different ways. First, more
people search for jobs without applying for DI, which will increase the employment rate.
Second, it becomes more difficult for the unemployed to find jobs because more people
look for jobs but firms have less incentives to hire workers due to higher wages resulting
from higher outside options for workers. This will decrease the employment rate. The
overall effects depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects. If the replacement
rate is sufficiently high, then the latter effect outweighs the former effect. As a result,
we have lower employment rates. In terms of the duration of UI, the employment rate of
the economy where the maximum length of time people collect UI benefits is 52 weeks,
is lower than that of the baseline economy (26 weeks). However, the employment rate
of the economy where the maximum length of time is 99 weeks, is higher than that of
the baseline economy. If the length of time is sufficiently longer, such as 99 weeks, the
former effect dominates the latter effect and the employment rate can be higher than
that of the baseline economy. In sum, more generous UI policies can lead to higher
employment rates in the presence of DI as opposed to literature in which more generous
UI policies generally decrease the employment rates due to less incentives for workers
to search for jobs or less incentive for firms to post vacancies.
1.5.2 Equilibrium with aggregate labor productivity shocks
Krusell-Smith (1998) approximation
κ = βq (θ (z, ψ))
∫
Ez,γ,e
[(
1− s′
)
Jx
(
γ
′
, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]×
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e)∫
ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
d(x, U, γ, a,m, e)
where ψs (x, U, γ, a,m, e) = I(gxs (U,γ,a,m,e;z,ψ)=1)ψ (x, U, γ, a,m, e)
Given that all unemployed people look for jobs in the same labor market, the market
tightness θ (z, ψ) depends on the measure of workers ψ as well as on the aggregate
labor productivity z as we can see in the free entry condition above. In this case, it
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is not possible to solve for the equilibrium with aggregate shocks outside of the steady
state because the measure is an infinite dimensional state variable. Krusell and Smith
(1998) approximate the equilibrium with aggregate shocks by replacing a measure with
finite moments of the economy under the assumption of bounded rationality. Following
their method, the measure ψ is replaced with the aggregate employment E in this
paper. Therefore, the aggregate state variables in this economy are {z, E} in stead of
{z, ψ}. In order to predict the market tightness θ and the future value for the aggregate
employment E
′
, I assume simple log-linear prediction functions for the market tightness
θ (z, E) and the aggregate employment E
′
:
log (θ) = bθ,0 + bθ,1log (E) + bθ,2log (z)
log (E′) = bE,0 + bE,1log (E) + bE,2log (z)
The details about the computation is described in the Appendix A. The following is the
converged prediction functions and their accuracies for the baseline model:
log (θ) = 0.5340 + 0.1033 log (E) + 0.8329 log (z) , R2 = 0.9524
log (E′) = −0.0001 + 0.9993 log (E) + 0.0015log (z) , R2 = 0.9987
Change in frequency of medical re-evaluation during a recession
To determine the effect of the policy change during the 1981 recession, I perform a
simple experiment24 : an unexpected one-time increase in the frequency of medical re-
evaluations. Figure 1.6 shows a series of aggregate labor productivities (Figure 1.6(a))
to generate a benchmark recession (Figure 1.6(b)) which is the average of other re-
cessions since 1965 except the 1981 recession. Given that aggregate labor productivity
shocks cannot generate sufficient variations in unemployment and employment in search
and matching models as noted in Shimer (2005), I need a big drop of aggregate labor
productivites to generate an appropriate magnitude of the recession in data. Given
44% of tightness of medical re-evaluations25 , I only change the frequency of medical
re-evaluations from 0.48% to 1.61% (monthly frequency) at the end of the 3rd quarter
24 This experiment is not exactly the same as what happened during the 1981 recession because there
might be several changes in the frequency during 1981-1983. I am working on a better experiment.
25 This is the average for the period 1981-1983. There was no significant change in the tightness
before and during the 1981 recession.
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after the onset of the recession. Figure 1.7 shows the inputs for the experiment. I
assume that this change is unexpected and it occurs after the decisions of the workers
are made in that period.
Figure 1.6: Aggregate labor productivity and paths of employment rates in the baseline
recession
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Figure 1.7: Inputs for the experiment: change in the frequency of med. re-evals during
a recession
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Figure 1.8 shows the main result for the experiment. As we can see Figure 1.8(a),
the model generates a deeper recession and faster recovery afterward. When I compare
the beginning and the trough of the recession, the employment rate is lower by 0.3
percentage points when the policy becomes more stringent. When I compare the start
of the recovery and after 2 years from that, the employment rate is higher by 0.9
percentage points when the policy becomes more stringent.
Figure 1.8: Results: change in frequency of medical re-evaluations
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Note that the recovery in the model is not as fast as the one in the data. There
might be other reasons for the faster recovery than medical re-evaluations, such as
expansionary monetary policies and tax cuts during the Reagan administration. Since
the aggregate productivity measured as total factor productivity (TFP) or aggregate
labor productivity is not that different across different recoveries as in Figure A.4, the
difference in productivity during recoveries does not seem to be the main reason.
Figure 1.9: Results: change in frequency of medical re-evaluations (continued)
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Aside from the other reasons like expansionary monetary policies and tax cuts during
the Reagan administration, the model has a problem regarding a magnitude of the
increase in DI recipients during the recession and its recovery as we can see in Figure
1.8(c). The number of DI recipients increases much more sharply compared to the one
in data. This problem may be related to the Shimer puzzle. As we discussed before as in
Figure 1.6(a), aggregate labor productivity shocks cannot generate sufficient variations
in unemployment and employment in search and matching models. Therefore, we need
a big drop of aggregate labor productivity to generate an appropriate magnitude of the
recession in data. The problem is that more unemployed people apply for DI when the
productivity drops as in Figure 1.5(b), and the big drop of aggregate labor productivites
makes more unemployed people apply for DI in the model than in data. This problem
can be addressed by using alternative calibrations proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), where a bargaining power of workers (0.052) is significantly lower than that of
the benchmark calibration (0.50).
The main mechanism for the deeper recession and faster recovery in the model is
as follows. Medical re-evaluations affect the number of people who search for jobs (di-
rect effect) and job-finding probabilities for all unemployed people (general equilibrium
effect). When the frequency unexpectedly increases at the end of the 3rd quarter, the
number of unemployed people significantly increases as in Figure 1.8(b). The increase
in the number of the unemployed results in a sharp decrease in job-finding probabilities
as we can see in Figure 1.8(d). As more people look for jobs, the probability of firms
meeting workers increases as in Figure 1.9(a). However, the expected value of hiring a
worker decreases as in Figure 1.9(b) because the inflow of terminated DI recipients into
the unemployment pool decreases the probability of meeting good (more productive)
workers. Since the former effect slightly dominates the latter effect, firms post more
vacancies compared to the economy where there is no change in the frequency of the
policy. Although firms post more vacancies, the increase in the number of people who
look for jobs outweighs the increase in the number of vacancies during the recession.
Consequently, the job-finding probabilities drops as we can see in Figure 1.8(d). In sum,
the effect of the drop in job-finding probabilities dominates the effect of the increase in
the number of people who look for jobs. Therefore, the recession becomes deeper com-
pared to the recession where no change in the frequency of the policy occurs. However,
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as the economy recovers, job-finding probabilities start to increase because more jobs
are posted as we can see in Figure 1.8(d). Consequently, the effect of the increase in
the number of people who look for jobs outweighs the effect of job-finding probabilities,
which leads to a faster recovery.
Figure 1.10: Results: change in frequency of medical re-evaluations (different timing)
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Note: All series from the model are converted to quarterly series by averaging three consequent monthly
series.
The timing of changing in frequency is also relevant. Figure 1.10 shows the results
for changes in frequency of medical re-evaluations at three different quarters. When the
policy changes at the end of the 4th quarter which is close to the trough of the recession,
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the drop in job-finding probabilities is the biggest as in Figure 1.8(d). This is because
firms are not likely to hire workers during this period. On the other hand, when the
policy changes at the end of the 5th quarter where the aggregate labor productivity
starts to recover, the drop in job-finding probabilities is negligible and the employment
rate does not drop at the time of the policy change.
Extension of duration of UI during a recession
In literature where disability insurance is not explicitly considered, the extension of the
length of time people collect UI benefits decreases employment rates. This is because
workers look for jobs less intensively26 and firms have less incentives to hire workers
due to higher wages resulting from higher outside options of workers27 . However, in
the presence of DI, the extended UI benefits could increase employment rate. This is
because there is one more important channel in the presence of DI. The extended UI
benefits induces more people to look for jobs by delaying their DI applications until UI
benefits are expired.
In this section, I perform an experiment in which the length of time people collect UI
benefits is extended during a recession. In this experiment, we compare three different
recessions:
1. Benchmark: no extension of the duration of UI benefits (26 weeks)
2. One time extension of the duration of UI benefits (26 weeks → 52 weeks at the
3rd quarter)
3. Further extension of the duration of UI benefits (26 weeks → 52 weeks at the 3rd
quarter → 99 weeks at the 6th quarter)
Figure 1.11 shows the results of the experiment. The extension of the duration of
UI benefits from 26 weeks to 52 weeks during a recession leads to a deeper recession
and slower recovery because it becomes more difficult for the unemployed to find jobs
throughout the recession and its recovery whereas the number of people who look for
jobs by delaying their DI applications does not increase much. However, if the duration
is further extended from 52 weeks to 99 weeks, the unemployed who have work limitation
26 See Nakajima (2012)
27 See Hagedorn et al. (2015)
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are more willing to look for jobs by delaying DI applications, and this effect dominates
the effect of the drop in job-finding probabilities during the recovery. Consequently, the
extended UI benefits lead to a faster recovery. This result implies that the extended UI
benefits during recessions can expedite recoveries in the presence of DI if the timing of
extension is well designed considering the state of the economy.
Figure 1.11: Results: extension of duration of UI
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 E
/P
*1
00
Quarters
 
 
Model (benchmark)
Model (extension of UI: 52 weeks)
Model (extension of UI: 52 weeks & 99 weeks)
(a) Employed/Population
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 U
/P
*1
00
Quarters
(b) Unemployed/Population
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 D
I r
ec
ip
ie
nt
s/
P*
10
0
Quarters
(c) DI recipients/Population
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.3
0.35
0.4
Jo
b−
fin
di
ng
 p
ro
ba
bi
liti
es
Quarters
(d) Job-finding probabilities
Note: All series from the model are converted to quarterly series by averaging three consequent monthly
series.
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1.6 Conclusion
In the US, the recovery in the employment rate of men from the 1981 recession was faster
than any other recovery since 1965. During the 1981 recession and at the beginning of
its recovery, the number of disability insurance (DI) applicants and recipients dropped
while the numbers increased in all other recessions due to the most stringent medical re-
evaluations between 1981 and 1983. Medical re-evaluation is a policy that periodically
terminates benefits of ineligible DI recipients. This paper examines the role of medical
re-evaluation for DI recipients in the 1981 recession and its fast recovery.
This paper makes several contributions. I document the fast recovery in the employ-
ment rate of men from the 1981 recession and the most stringent medical re-evaluations
during 1981-1983. In terms of model, to the best of my knowledge, I build the first
general equilibrium business-cycle model with DI. We can use the model to analyze
how DI policies affect unemployed people, including those who have no work limitation,
through changes in job-finding probabilities. Quantitatively, this paper examines the
effect of medical re-evaluations on the 1981 recession and its fast recovery and the role
of an extended duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the presence of DI
during recessions.
I build a general equilibrium business-cycle search and matching model with health,
DI, and UI eligibility. The model is calibrated to match key features of the US economy
for 1986-1992 by using the PSID, CPS, and public SSA data. Given that the model has
aggregate labor productivity shocks and heterogeneous workers are matched randomly
in the labor market, Krusell-Smith (1998) approximation is used to solve for the model
outside of the steady state.
To determine the effect of the policy change during the 1981 recession, I perform
a simple experiment: an unexpected one-time increase in the frequency of medical
re-evaluations during a recession. The experiment shows that more frequent medical
re-evaluations during the 1981 recession made the recession deeper and the recovery
faster. Lastly, aside from the main experiment, I use the model to examine the role of
the extended length of time people collect UI benefits in the presence of DI during a
recession. The experiment shows that in the presence of DI, the extended UI benefits
during recessions can expedite recoveries if the timing of extension is well designed
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considering the state of the economy.
Chapter 2
Labor Market Fluctuations and
the Role of Financial Shocks
2.1 Introduction
The financial turmoil that began with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 brought
about not only one of the largest decreases in real GDP in the US since the Great De-
pression, but also a substantial increase in the rate of unemployment. The unemploy-
ment rate jumped from 4.7% in 2007:Q4 to 9.9% in 2009:Q4 while real GDP decreased
at an astonishing -1.7% annualized rate over the same time period. High unemployment
has persisted and continues to be a challenge today, even after real GDP has recovered
to pre-recession levels. It seems natural to assess the role credit markets have played in
the sharp decrease in employment and its sluggish recovery to pre-recession levels.
The financial crisis and resulting Great Recession have fostered renewed interest in
the incorporation of financial frictions in macroeconomic models. Many recent studies
have emphasized the importance of employing such frictions to account for macroe-
conomic fluctuations in key variables over the business cycle. In particular, so called
‘financial shocks’ have been deemed significant contributing factors for the observed
dynamics of real and financial variables over the business cycle. Financial shocks di-
rectly affect the financial sector of the economy as opposed to standard productivity
shocks that are merely propagated through the financial sector. However, applicable
studies have been silent about how unemployment and job postings interact with the
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deterioration of credit market conditions. In order to address this shortcoming, we
evaluate just how important financial shocks are in accounting for movements in key
labor market variables by using a standard real business cycle (RBC) matching model
which incorporates financial frictions via an enforcement constraint. We assess the im-
portance of incorporating financial shocks into our model by comparing our results to
those of a standard matching model without financial frictions. We take our benchmark
matching model without financial frictions to be the model developed by Andolfatto
(1996) (simply Andolfatto hereafter). We refer to this as the standard matching model
throughout.
While analyzing the role of the financial sector over the business cycle is not a new
topic, most previous studies utilized the credit channels formalized by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
and treated the financial sector as an accelerator of productivity shocks. This standard
credit channel differs from those developed more recently by Perri and Quadrini (2011)
and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (JQ hereafter), which incorporate financial shocks
that directly affect the financial sector’s ability to lend. That is, the financial sector not
only propagates productivity shocks originating from other sectors of the economy, but
it also acts as a source of the business cycle itself via financial shocks. The latter studies
have emphasized the impact of financial shocks in their explanations for labor market
fluctuations but offer no means for analyzing the extensive margin of employment in
their framework.
Some authors have already highlighted the need for addressing the role of financial
frictions on unemployment. Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) uses asymmetric information and
costly state verification between financial intermediaries and borrowers which increases
both the magnitude and persistence of unemployment fluctuations relative to a standard
neoclassical growth model. Chugh (2013) uses a similar credit channel but builds a
model with capital accumulation. Monacelli, Trigari, and Quadrini (2012) use a model
with linear utility and no capital accumulation and show that borrowing more from
financial intermediaries shifts bargaining weight from the worker to the firm which can
explain why firms cut hiring after a negative financial shock even in the absence of a
liquidity shortage. Our study departs from previous approaches and employs the credit
channel used in JQ in order to compare the gains of adding financial frictions over a
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Table 2.1: Business cycle statistics, 1984:Q1-2012:Q1
Variable (x) σx% ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Output 1.12 – 0.87
Total Hours 1.26 0.85 0.89
Employment 0.88 0.82 0.93
Hours per Worker 0.45 0.77 0.61
Wages 0.91 -0.18 0.77
Labor Productivity 0.66 0.07 0.59
Labor Share 0.73 -0.28 0.78
Vacancies 11.26 0.86 0.91
Equity Payouts/GDP 1.39 0.69 0.91
Debt Repurchases/GDP 2.23 -0.84 0.93
standard matching model as developed by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Our
model framework is somewhat related to that of Garin (2012), but his study neither
utilizes the intensive margin nor compare the results to a standard RBC matching model.
This distinction is important since the response along the intensive margin to financial
frictions and shocks in our model is quite different from that along the extensive margin.
We start by documenting the cyclical properties of key variables for the US economy
over the period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1 in Table 2.1. We chose this period for our analysis since
JQ have argued that 1984 corresponds to a break in the volatility in many business cycle
variables and that this time period also saw the stabilization of structural change in US
financial markets compared to previous periods. All variables are deflated by population,
logged (except debt repurchases and equity payouts), and HP-filtered. Debt repurchases
and equity payouts statistics are computed after detrending with a band-pass filter that
preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years (Lawrence J. Christiano and Terry J. Fitzgerald (2003)).
Wages are defined as real labor compensation per labor-hour. A detailed description of
the data used in Table 2.1 and throughout our study can be found in the Appendix B.
A few elements in Table 2.1 deserve some discussion. First, employment is much
more volatile than hours worked per worker. While total hours fluctuate more than out-
put itself, most of this is adjusts along the extensive margin. The relative contribution
of variance in hours per worker to total hours worked is 32%. Thus, the intensive margin
is one that should be incorporated into any model seeking to understand fluctuations
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in total hours worked in the US economy. Employment and total hours tend to lag
output by one quarter while hours worked and vacancies are coincident variables which
suggests firms are able to adjust the intensive margin and post vacancies quicker than
they can adjust the stock of employees. We will incorporate this fact into our model.
Second, real wages are almost as volatile as output, but are surprisingly countercyclical
over our sample period. Third, the labor share is countercyclical, implying that during
periods of expansion, labor is allocated relatively less of the gains. Finally, note that
equity payouts are strongly procyclical while debt repurchases are strongly countercycli-
cal. As JQ pointed out, there seems to be substitutability between equity payouts and
debt repurchases over the business cycle. It is our goal to see what gains can be made
in accounting for the fluctuations in the variables reported in Table 2.1 once financial
shocks are incorporated into a standard matching model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II proposes a model with labor market
frictions, financial frictions, and financial shocks. Section III discusses the calibration of
the models. Section IV studies the quantitative properties of our benchmark model and
our proposed model. Section IV studies the importance of financial shocks by comparing
our model’s results to those of a standard matching model. Section VI concludes
2.2 Model
Our model framework follows closely the models developed by JQ and Andolfatto. Since
the Andolfatto model has a matching framework but no financial frictions, we take this
to be our benchmark model to compare our results to. We will refer to the benchmark
model as the Andolfatto model, the standard matching model, or simply Andolfatto.
Note that the equations characterizing the solution to our model with financial frictions
can quickly be mapped into the Andolfatto model by shutting down both the financial
shock processes and the Lagrange multipliers on the enforcement constraint. For this
reason, we do not lay out the Andolfatto model explicitly but choose to develop our
model with financial frictions first.
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2.2.1 Matching
Time is discrete and goes on forever. The timing of our model is as follows: (i) shocks
are realized, (ii) wages and hours are bargained over, (iii) firms take our intra-period
loans, (iv) production takes place and vacancies are posted, and then (v) separations
and matches occur.
Labor markets are frictional and the law of motion of total employment, N , depends
on the number of matches that occur at the end of each period. We take one model
period to be one quarter. We assume that the number of matches is dictated by a
constant returns-to-scale matching technology which depends on the total number of
unemployed, U ≡ 1 − N , and on the total number of vacancies, V , posted by firms:
M(V, 1−N). Defining V/ (1−N) ≡ θ as labor market tightness, we then define the job-
finding rate as Ψ(θ) = M(θ, 1) and the job-filling rate as Φ(θ) = M(1, 1/θ). Assuming
that jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate χ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that employment
evolves according to:
N ′ = (1− χ)N + Ψ(θ)(1−N)
2.2.2 Households
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households each of measure one.
Each household is endowed with a unit of time to split between working hours and leisure
hours and each household derives utility from consumption and leisure. Households
discount the future by the factor β ∈ (0, 1). We model a representative household
similar to Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), which allows for perfect unemployment
insure across households. This, along with the assumption that there are no search costs,
implies that every unemployed household will always be searching for a job. Households
trade uncontingent bonds, aH , and shares in firms, s. Unemployed households receive
the unemployment benefit b ≥ 0 from the government and each household pays the
lump-sum tax T . We can then write the program of the representative household as:
V (S, sH) = max
c,s′,a′H
{u(c) + nν(1− h) + (1− n)ν(1) + βE[V (S′, s′H)]}
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s.t.
c+
a′H
1 + r (S)
+ p (S) s′ = w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) + (1− n)b+ aH + [p (S) + d (S)] s− T (S)
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Ψ (S) (1− n)
S′ = G(S), c ≥ 0, No-Ponzi condition
The aggregate state of the economy is given by S = {z, ξ;K,B,N,D−}, where z is total
factor productivity and ξ is the financial shock which both evolve stochastically. K is
the aggregate capital stock, B is total bond holdings of the household sector, N is total
employment, and D− is the amount of dividends paid out last period. sH = {s, aH , n}
is the individual state, and G is the law of motion for aggregate state variables. d is the
dividend paid to shareholders, and p is the share price of the representative firm.
Wages and hours are the result of a Nash-bargaining problem between workers
and the firm at the beginning of each period, so from the household’s perspective
w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) is given before any consumption or savings decisions take place.
Since we have assumed separable utility between consumption and leisure, the intra-
household consumption level doesn’t depend on employment status as noted in Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Note that this has the implication that unemployed
households are better off than those that are employed since they receive the same con-
sumption level as those that are employed but enjoy all the leisure. This implication is
discussed in detail in Cheron and Langot (2004). The first order conditions (dropping
the dependence on states) from the household’s problem give:
1 = E
[
m′ (1 + r)
]
1 = E
[
m′
(
p′ + d′
p
)]
where m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c) is the stochastic discount factor. These equations taken to-
gether simply give us the no-arbitrage condition between shares and bonds. All deriva-
tions of first order conditions for all agents can be found in the Appendix B.
2.2.3 Firms
We model the firm and derive an enforcement constraint similar to JQ. There exists
a representative firm with gross revenue F (z, k, nh), where z is the stochastic level
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of aggregate productivity. Capital evolves according to the standard law of motion
k′ = (1− δ) k+ i, where i is investment and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of depreciation. Firms
discount the future via the stochastic discount factor m′ and pay the fixed cost cv > 0
to post a vacancy. The firm also pays the equity payout cost ϕ(d, d−) to pay dividends
to shareholders. We impose this dividend adjust cost to capture the observation that
firms tend to smooth dividends as well as to formalize the financial friction. Firms use
equity and debt with debt preferred to equity due to the subsidy τ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
the effective gross interest rate that the representative firm faces every period is given
by R = 1 + r (1− τ).
After negotiating wages and hours, firms take out the intra-period loan lt to finance
working capital. Before receiving any revenue from production, the firm pays the wage
bill wnh, chooses investment, chooses the equity payout d and the associated adjustment
cost, the number of vacancies v to post, and new intertemporal debt a′F . Since all
payments are done before the realization of revenues, the firm must take out the intra-
period loan:
l = wnh+ i+ cvv + ϕ(d, d−) + aF − a
′
F
R
The firm’s budget constraint every period is
i+ aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh)− wnh− cvv + a
′
F
R
It follows that the intra-period loan is simply total expected revenue, l = F (z, k, nh).
The firm has the option to default after total revenues are realized but before the
working capital loan l is paid back. At this moment in time, the firm holds liquidity l
and total liabilities l + a′F / (1 + r). Since firms can easily abscond with the liquidity l,
the lender can only recover the firm’s physical capital stock k′ with probability ξ, which
is stochastic. With probability (1− ξ), the lender’s recovery value is zero. One can be
interpret this probability as the probability of finding a buyer of the firm’s capital stock.
In the case of default, the lender and the firm can negotiate a payment after the
liquidation value of the capital stock is realized. We assume that the firm has all the
bargaining power in this negotiation process and the lender will only get the threat
value.
If the liquidation value is zero, the lender will not shutdown the firm because it
is better off waiting for the intertemporal loan a′F to come due. The firm keeps the
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liquidity l in this case. Therefore, the total ex-post value of default in the case when
the liquidation value is zero is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
where m′ is the stochastic discount factor and J ′ is the value of the firm tomorrow. That
is, E [m′J ′] is the expected present value of the firm if the firm continues to operate.
If the liquidation value is k′, the firm will negotiate the payment P to prevent the
lender liquidating the firm. The net surplus to the firm of avoiding liquidation is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]− P
The lender’s net surplus of reaching an agreement is:
P +
a′F
1 + r
− k′
Assuming the firm holds all the bargaining power, the firm must pay P = k′−a′F / (1 + r)
to avoid liquidation. It follows that the total net surplus of reaching an agreement is:
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
+
a′F
1 + r
− k′
Since the liquidation value is not known until after the default takes place, when the
intra-period loan is contracted, the expected total net surplus to the firm (since they
have all the bargaining power) is
ξ
(
l + E
[
m′J ′
]
+
a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ (1− ξ) (l + E [m′J ′])
= ξ
(
a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ l + E
[
m′J ′
]
Incentive compatibility requires that the expected surplus of defaulting not exceed the
value of not defaulting. This requires that
E
[
m′J ′
] ≥ ξ( a′F
1 + r
− k′
)
+ l + E
[
m′J ′
]
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r
)
≥ l = F (z, k, nh)
The firm’s ability to borrow is limited by the enforcement constraint derived above.
Higher debt in the form of either inter-temporal or intra-temporal loans is associated
with a tighter enforcement constraint while a higher capital stock loosens the enforce-
ment constraint. Since employment (due to the lack of endogenous separations), pro-
ductivity, the probability ξ, and the capital stock are given, the firm only has control
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over k′, a′F , and the intensive margin h. We refer to innovations in ξ as ‘financial shocks’
since it directly affects the firm’s capacity to borrow from lenders. Negative innovations
can be viewed as a deterioration in credit market conditions.
We can then write the program of the representative firm as:
J(S, sF ) = max
d,k′,a′F ,v,n′
{d+ E[m′J(S′, s′F )]}
s.t.
k′ + aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh (S, sF )) + (1− δ)k − w (S, sF )nh (S, sF )− cvv + a
′
F
R (S)
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r (S)
)
≥ F (z, k, nh (S, sF ))
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Φ (S) v
S′ = G(S), k′, v ≥ 0
where sF = {k, aF , n, d−} is the individual state, R = 1+r(1−τ), and the firm’s equity
payout cost is ϕ(d, d−). Once again note that wages and hours are bargained at the
beginning of the period and are treated as given in the program described above.
The first order conditions (dropping state dependencies) to the firm’s problem gives:
1 = λϕd + E[m
′λ′ϕ′d ]
λcv = ΦE
[
m′J ′n
]
λ− γξ = E [m′ [(λ′ − γ′)F ′k + (1− δ)λ′]]
λ (1 + r)− γR = R (1 + r)E [m′λ′]
where λ and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and en-
forcement constraint, respectively. To see how these equations relate to the Andolfatto
model, simply consider the equations above and set R = 1 + r, λ = 1, and γ = 0.
2.2.4 Nash bargaining
Wages and hours are bargained over at the beginning of each period via a Nash bar-
gaining problem between the representative household and the representative firm. Em-
ploying the notation from above, the value of an additional worker to the representative
household is (in terms of consumption units):
Vn
uc
=
ν (1− h)− ν (1)
uc
+ wh− b+ (1− χ−Ψ)β
[
V ′n
uc
]
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The value to the representative firm of an additional worker is:
Jn = (λ− γ)Fnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E
[
m′J ′n
]
where λ and γ are, again, the Lagrange multipliers on the firm’s budget constraint and
enforcement constraint, respectively. Following Andolfatto (1996), it is assumed that
the each worker is so small such that Fnh ≡ ∂F/∂ (nh) is taken as given by both the
household and the firm during the bargaining process. Given the worker’s bargaining
weight µ ∈ (0, 1), the wage and hours are the result of the Nash bargaining problem:
(w, h) = arg max
w,h
(
Vn
uc
)µ
(Jn)
1−µ
Taking the derivatives with respect to wages and hours gives us the sharing rule of
the production surplus and the static condition determining the number of hours.
µJn = λ (1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)
ν(1−h) (1− h)
uc
=
(
1− γ
λ
)
Fnh
Using the sharing rule, µJn = λ (1− µ) (Vn/uc), along with the definition of Vn/uc and
Jn, gives the wage bill per worker:
wh = µ
[(
1− γ
λ
)
Fn + (1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+
V
1−N ΦE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
]]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b− (1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]]
This is simply a weighted average of (i) the effective marginal productivity of a worker
plus the expected future value of maintaining the match plus the average discounted
savings to the firm of not having to post a vacancy next period and (ii) the endogenous
outside option of the worker which is simply the forfeited leisure in terms of consumption
units as well as the unemployment benefit b minus the future value of maintaining the
match. The marginal productivity of each worker Fn is driven down by the effective
tightness of the enforcement constraint γ/λ. This is the key equation driving our results.
According to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (HM hereafter), in order to increase
the volatility of vacancies and employment, we need to increase the volatility of the firm’s
surplus per worker. In order to achieve this, they calibrate a low bargaining weight and
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a high value of the outside option for workers. The low value of the bargaining weight
of workers makes the wage bill per worker less volatile in response to the marginal
productivity of each worker Fn. The workers’ higher outside option makes the firm’s
surplus small. These two properties taken together makes the firm’s surplus per worker
more sensitive to the marginal productivity of each worker Fn, which means firms have a
greater incentive to post vacancies. Financial frictions have a similar effect by generating
an additional wedge between the wage bill per worker and the marginal productivity
of each worker Fn. When financial frictions are present, capital is more ‘valuable’ to
the firm than an additional worker since capital has the added benefit of loosening the
enforcement constraint in this model.
In our setup, positive financial shocks and negative productivity shocks will increase
the outside option of workers endogenously. For these shocks, firms will choose to
increase hours per worker since both shocks will relax the enforcement constraint and
hours can be increased instantly unlike the stock of employees or capital. Since workers
will work more on average, the outside option of not working increases. As a result,
the firm’s surplus per worker becomes more sensitive to the marginal productivity of
each additional worker Fn, which gives the firm more of an incentive to change vacancy
postings in response to shocks.
To see the effect of the enforcement constraint on the wage bill more clearly, consider
the case in which the equity payout is simply ϕ (d, d−) = d. In this case, there are no
costs associated with adjusting the dividend and ϕd = 1/λ = 1. It follows that we can
write the wage bill in (2.12) as
wh = µ
[
(1− γ)Fn +
(
V
1−N
)
cv
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b
]
Since γ ≥ 0, the tighter the enforcement constraint, the lower the effective marginal
productivity of each worker to the firm becomes. That is to say, in situations in which
the shadow price of the enforcement constraint increases, the bargaining weight shifts
away from workers to the firm due to the fact that the firm would like to decrease the
number of employees in order to loosen the enforcement constraint. However, since
there are no endogenous separations, the firm is inhibited from decreasing either the
capital stock or the stock of workers and must do so along the intensive margin. The
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shadow price of our enforcement constraint will increase during positive shocks to total
factor productivity and in situation in which the credit market conditions deteriorate.
If there were no credit market frictions in our environment or during situations
in which our enforcement constraint becomes nonbinding (γ = 0), our wage bill would
collapse to the standard matching model sharing rule:
wh = µ
[
Fn +
(
V
1−N
)
cv
]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b
]
This last equation will correspond to the wage bill in the Andolfatto benchmark
model. The derivation of the equations above is detailed in the Appendix B.
2.2.5 Government
The government in this model simply raises revenue in order to subsidize firm’s borrow-
ing and to pay out the unemployment benefits b to the mass of unemployed households.
This is simply:
T (S) =
(
1
R (S)
− 1
1 + r (S)
)
a′F (S, sF ) + (1−N) b
where S once again denotes the aggregate state.
2.2.6 Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions for (i) the household’s
policies c (S, sH) , s
′ (S, sH) , and a′H (S, sH); (ii) the household’s value function V (S, sH);
(iii) the firm’s policies d (S, sF ) , k
′ (S, sF ) , a′F (S, sF ) , and v (S, sF ); (iv) the firm’s value
function J(S, sF ); (v) aggregate prices r (S) , R (S) , p (S) , and m
′ (S, S′); (vi) taxes
T (S); (vii) the law of motion for aggregate states S′ = G(S). Such that: (i) the
household’s policies are optimal and V (S, sH) satisfies the Bellman’s equation (2.1); (ii)
the firm’s policies are optimal and J(S, sF ) satisfies the Bellman’s equation (2.4); (iii)
m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c); (iv) the government’s budget is balanced; (v) wages and hours
(w (S, sH , sF ) , h (S, sH , sF )) is the solution to the bilateral Nash bargaining problem
given by equation (2.9); (vi) markets clear, s′ = 1, a′F = a
′
H ; (vii) the law of motion
G (S) is consistent with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and ξ.
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2.3 Calibration of the model
We must now specify some functional forms in order to evaluate our model’s quantitative
results. We define the matching technology, the aggregate production technology and
the equity payout cost to be:
M(V, 1−N) = ωV ψ(1−N)1−ψ
F (z,K,Nh) = zKα(Nh)1−α
ϕ(d, d−) = d+ κ(d− d−)2
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) , α ∈ (0, 1) and κ ≥ 0. The representative household’s preferences take
the form:
u(c) = log(c)
ν(`) =
φ
`1−η
1−η if ` ∈ [0, 1)
φu if ` = 1
and the stochastic processes follow an autoregressive system:(
z′
ξ′
)
= A
(
z
ξ
)
+
(
εz
εξ
)
(
εz
εξ
)
∼ N (0,Σ)
where εz and εξ are normally distributed innovations with variance-covariance matrix
Σ. We now left to determine twenty-one parameters in the model.
Our parameters can be categorized into three groups based on the way we chose
to calibrate them. The first set of parameters are predetermined outside model. The
second group is a set of parameters for the shock processes which are estimated from
the constructed Solow residual and financial shock series. The last group of parameters
consists of parameters determined endogenously in the model. We calibrate these pa-
rameters using simulated method of moments with a number of targets to be matched.
To jointly choose this group of parameters, we minimize the distance between seven
moments in the data and the in the model.
2.3.1 Predetermined parameters
We set the unemployment benefit b = 0, so this plays no role in our analysis. We
basically follow Andolfatto (1996) for the discount factor β = 0.99, the depreciation
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rate δ = 0.025, the separation rate χ = 0.15 and the matching elasticity ψ = 0.60.
Since we focus on an economy where the wage in the labor market is determined in a
non-competitive fashion, we cannot use labor share data to pin down α. Rather, we
choose a value for α = 0.64, which is common across the macroeconomic literature and
it is also the same as Andolfatto (1996). We choose the tax benefit of debt in a similar
to JQ, τ = 0.35. Finally, we set the bargaining weight of workers µ = 0.35, which is a
middle of HM (2008) and Shimer (2005). To summarize:
Table 2.2: Predetermined parameters
Parameter Description Value Remarks
β Discount factor 0.99 annual rate of return 4%
δ Depreciation rate 0.025 Andolfatto (1996)
χ Job-separation rate 0.15 Andolfatto (1996)
ψ Matching elasticity 0.60 Andolfatto (1996)
α CD parameter for capital 0.36 Andolfatto (1996)
τ Tax benefit (subsidy) 0.35 JQ (2012)
µ Bargaining weight 0.35 middle of HM and Shimer
All these parameters, except τ , will also be used in the Andolfatto model.
2.3.2 Parameters for the shock processes
We construct our z series using the definition of our aggregate production function.
In order to construct a series of the measured Solow residual, we must first specify
a series for Yt,Kt, Nt, and ht. We use Current Population Survey data on the level of
employment (Nt) and the average weekly hours worked (ht). Yt is simply real GDP taken
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We construct our capital stock using Flow of
Funds data for the nonfinancial business sector and deflate the level of investment each
period by the business GDP price index taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Depreciation is taken to be the consumption of fixed capital of nonfinancial business
Since we only have flows of net capital expenditures and not a level, we pick K0 in 1952
such that the capital-output ratio displays no trend. Since we begin the recursion in
1952 and our analysis begins in 1984:Q1, it is not relevant for our results based on the
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time period for our analysis. Log-linearizing our aggregate production function gives:
zˆt = yˆt − αkˆt − (1− α) Nˆt − (1− α) hˆt
where hats denote log-deviations from a linear trend for each variable estimated over
the period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1. We normalize z¯ = 1.
For the construction of our financial shocks, we make the assumption that the en-
forcement constraint is always binding. Of course, the validity of this assumption is
critical for the construction of our financial shock series. We verify ex-post: after con-
structing the series for the shocks and feeding them into the model to verify that the
Lagrange multiplier is always strictly greater than zero. This assumption is strong
and open for debate. However, we feel that viewing the nonfinancial business sector in
the aggregate as always being constrained is not an outrageous assumption to make.
Log-linearizing the enforcement constraint (equation (2.4)), gives us:
ξˆt =
ξ¯b¯e
y¯
bˆet+1 −
ξ¯k¯
y¯
kˆt+1 + yˆt
where we construct bˆet+1 using Flow of Funds data for net borrowing in credit market
instruments in the nonfinancial business sector deflated by the business GDP price index.
yˆt in this case is not total GDP but real business GDP. Details of the data can be found
in the Appendix B. The capital stock is as defined previously. We fix b¯e/y¯ = 3.37
to match the liabilities-output ratio over our sample period. This, in turn, gives us
ξ¯k¯/y¯ = 1.4362 and ξ¯b¯e/y¯ = 0.4361. We then use the constructed series for zˆt and ξˆt and
estimate a vector-autoregressive process over the time period 1984:Q1-2012:Q1. This
gives us the matrix of coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix:
A
(
z
ξ
)
=
(
0.9910 −0.0351
0.2403 0.8978
)(
z
ξ
)
Σ =
(
0.00502 0.000027
0.000027 0.00792
)
For our Andolfatto benchmark model without financial frictions, we simply have a
AR(1) process for the productivity given by:
ρz = 0.9426
V ar (εz) = 0.0051
2
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2.3.3 Parameters determined using targets
For our remaining seven parameters, we use the simulated method of moments to min-
imize the distance between seven moments from the data and from the model. Our
seven targets are:
1. Frisch elasticity of hours for those employed: 0.5
2. Steady-state employment to population ratio: 62%
3. Steady-state hours per worker: 0.39 (weekly potential hours are assumed to be
100)
4. Steady-state job-filling rate: 90%
5. Vacancy expenditures-output ratio: 2.18%
6. Debt to GDP ratio: 3.37
7. Standard deviation of the equity payout-GDP ratio: 1.39
According to Silva and Toledo (2009), the average cost of time spent hiring one
worker is approximately 3.6%-4.3% of total labor costs. We target the median, 3.9%, of
these estimates. In terms of our model, this implies cvvΦwnh = 0.039, which in turn gives
cvv
y = 0.218 given our targets for the job-filling rate Φ = 0.9 and the labor share = 0.62,
which is the average labor share over our sample period. κ is chosen to have a standard
deviation of the equity payout-GDP ratio generated by the model equal to that of data.
For the calibration of the Andolfatto model, we omit the last two targets listed above
from the calibration since κ and ξ¯ are not present in that model environment. These
targets give the following set of parameters for both our model (KS model, which stands
for Kim and Seliski) and the Andolfatto model:
2.4 Results and discussion
We solve both the KS and Andolfatto models using 2nd order approximation around
the steady-state. The derivation of the nonlinear equations characterizing both models’
equilibriums can be found in the Appendix B. We first show the resulting impulse
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Table 2.3: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description KS Andolfatto
η Curvature parameter for leisure 3.1166 3.1166
φ Scale parameter for leisure 0.7814 0.7797
φu Leisure for unemployed 0.2525 0.2554
cv Cost of posting a vacancy 0.1960 0.1875
ω Matching efficiency 0.5349 0.5349
ξ Mean of credit process 0.1294 –
κ Equity payout cost 0.1460 –
response functions for the KS model in order to develop some intuition underlying our
results.
2.4.1 Innovations to productivity
Figure 2.1: IRFs to a one standard deviation shock to TFP
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When a productivity shock hits the KS model economy, the enforcement constraint
instantly tightens. Since the stock of employees and capital are fixed, firms can only
loosen the constraint via hours per worker and investing in a higher kt+1. Hours in
the model respond immediately because they can substitute for bodies that cannot
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be increased due to the nature of the hiring process. Once employees are separated
exogenously, hours recovers back to its steady-state level.
In response to a positive productivity shock, the firm allocates resources away from
labor input by decreasing both wages and hours and allocating the savings to investment.
This is consistent with the countercyclical nature of the labor share reported earlier.
The shift in bargaining power is due to the shock increasing the ratio of the Lagrange
multipliers, effectively lowering the marginal product of each worker to the firm. The
reason for the firm allocating more resources to capital is clear. After a tightening of the
enforcement constraint, capital is deemed more ‘valuable’ to the firm because investment
in capital tomorrow loosens the constraint. That is, labor and capital are imperfect
substitutes not only due to their role in the production process, but also due to the
added benefit of the higher capital stock loosening the enforcement constraint. The firm
wishes to build up capital initially to loosen the constraint for future periods in order to
take advantage of the persistence in the positive productivity shock. After employment
begins to move (since it cannot move immediately), both wages and hours recover after
the firm has effectively loosened the enforcement constraint by accumulating a higher
capital stock.
Figure 2.2: IRFs to a one standard deviation shock to TFP
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To visually see what is going on with the effective marginal product per worker,
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recall from the wage bargaining solution that (1− γ/λ)Fn is the effective benefit to
the firm of employing an additional worker. The interpretation of γ/λ is the shadow
price of the enforcement constraint discounted by the firm’s marginal cost of financing
operations via equity. We plot the deviations of the effective shadow price below.
The kinks are due to the frictional nature of employment (employment cannot ad-
just when the shock is initially realized). While the shadow price associated with the
constraint is quite high initially, it quickly drops off as the firm accumulates capital in
order to loosen the constraint. Once the constraint has been loosened, due to the higher
kt+1, the firm begins to accumulate employees once again by posting vacancies.
Figure 2.3: IRFs to a one standard deviation shock to TFP
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Figure 2.3 shows how the firms finance their operations and how much of their
resources are devoted to hiring purposes after a productivity shock. Once again, the
kink is the result of the lagged nature of employment. Initially, the firm finance their
capital accumulation not only by reducing labor inputs and labor costs, but also via
reductions in equity payouts. The firms use internal finances briefly to accumulate
capital resources. It is noteworthy that equity payouts reach their peak over a year
after the TFP innovation. This can be viewed as the firm paying out the highest
dividends once it has adjusted both employment and capital to a situation in which
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the enforcement constraint’s shadow price reaches its minimum deviation. Dividend
payouts reach its peak around the same time that γ/λ reaches its minimum deviation.
That is, the opportunity cost associated with diverting resources to dividend payments
is at its lowest level.
2.4.2 Innovations to credit conditions
We now consider the situations in which our model economy is hit by a negative financial
shock.
Figure 2.4: IRFs to a negative one standard deviation financial shock
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Similar to the productivity case, investment is hit hardest by an innovation to the
financial process. As the firm faces a tighter enforcement constraint due to the negative
financial shock, it immediately cuts hours, wages and investment. Since the firm cannot
immediately adjust employment, employment does not drop until the period after the
shock. One of the key differences between the financial shock and the productivity
shock, is the speed at which the economy recovers to its steady-state levels. This is in
contrast to many findings that periods of financial distress lead to prolonged recessions.
As in the positive productivity case, a negative financial shock shifts bargaining power
away from the worker. Again, this is due to the tightness of the borrowing constraint
driving down the effective marginal product of an additional worker to the firm.
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Figure 2.5: IRFs to a negative one standard deviation financial shock
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The effective shadow price of the enforcement constraint displays a very similar
pattern to the positive productivity case but drops off faster to return near to its
steady-state ratio. Workers quickly recover their bargaining position as the ratio of
the Lagrange multipliers returns near its steady-state level.
The most pronounced difference between the productivity and financial shock cases
is the movement of financial variables, which one would expect. The firm decreases
its debt position and continues to decrease it for some time after the financial shock.
The firm also reduces its equity payouts but eventually increases them after some time.
This is consistent with the observation that both equity payouts and debt positions
are reduced during periods of financial turmoil as reported in JQ. To highlight the
contributions of each shock to key variables, we report the variance decomposition of
each shock.
Financial shocks have a substantial impact on the volatility of both hours per worker
and the labor share. The effects of financial shocks on the volatility of output and em-
ployment are relatively low. Despite equity and debt being financial variables, the
impact of financial shocks on these is relatively similar to productivity shocks. While
productivity shocks are still the main source of fluctuations along the extensive margin
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Figure 2.6: IRFs to a negative one standard deviation financial shock
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and seem to be the key driver in overall business cycle fluctuations, the impact of finan-
cial shocks is far from negligible on hours worked per worker. Financial shocks account
for 36% of the volatility in total hours worked, mostly due to the impact of financial
shocks on hours worked per worker. This, along with the fact that vacancies, hours,
and the labor share are quite sensitive to financial shocks, provides evidence that incor-
porating financial shocks into a matching model results in a measurable improvement
in the overall understanding of labor market fluctuations.
2.4.3 Comparing results
We now compare our results to the Andolfatto model (model without financial frictions)
to see what gains and what shortcomings the incorporation of financial frictions pro-
vides. Both the KS and Andolfatto models are simulated for 350 periods 500 times.
Eighty-eight periods of data are burned in order to strip out the importance of initial
values.Variables are then logged and HP-filtered (except debt repurchases and equity
payouts).
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Table 2.4: Variance decomposition (percent)
Variable zˆ ξˆ
Output 86.20 13.80
Total Hours 63.99 36.01
Employment 83.36 16.64
Hours per Worker 8.44 91.56
Wages 76.38 23.62
Labor Productivity 85.73 14.27
Labor Share 19.15 80.85
Vacancies 61.09 38.91
Equity Payouts/GDP 45.74 54.26
Debt Repurchases/GDP 48.69 51.31
Table 2.5: Business cycle moments
σx% ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Data KS Andolfatto Data KS Andolfatto Data KS Andolfatto
Output 1.12 1.15 0.94 – – – 0.97 0.78 0.81
Total Hours 1.26 0.94 0.50 0.85 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.66 0.90
Employment 0.88 0.60 0.45 0.82 0.77 0.81 0.93 0.83 0.86
Hours per Worker 0.45 0.64 0.14 0.77 0.54 0.72 0.61 0.15 0.48
Wages 0.91 0.62 0.41 -0.18 0.78 0.96 0.77 0.33 0.67
Labor Productivity 0.66 0.58 0.51 0.07 0.58 0.94 0.59 0.59 0.58
Labor Share 0.73 0.79 0.13 -0.28 0.18 -0.67 0.78 0.27 0.44
Vacancies 11.26 3.73 2.60 0.86 0.71 0.72 0.91 0.31 0.45
Equity Payouts/GDP 1.39 1.39 – 0.69 0.70 – 0.91 0.89 –
Debt Repurchases/GDP 2.23 2.07 – -0.84 -0.78 – 0.93 0.88 –
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The addition of financial shocks into the matching model has a marked impact on
key labor market variables. While the Andolfatto model generates high employment
volatility, it is still orders of magnitude less than the data. The KS model improves
the model’s performance along this dimension. We are able to match the volatility of
total hours and labor productivity quite well. However, our model performs poorly in
replicating movements in wages and capturing the countercyclical nature of the labor
share. Additionally, while the data has the intensive margin accounting for 32% of the
variation in total hours worked, the KS model delivers 53%, overstating the importance
of hours worked per worker while the Andolfatto model delivers only 14%.
Despite these shortcomings, our results comport to a greater extent with actual
data than the Andolfatto model, indicating that the addition of financial frictions and
financial shocks have a positive impact on matching moments from the data. This, taken
together with the variance decomposition implies that financial shocks are an important
dimension to incorporate into standard matching models. Our credit channel shows up
through the multipliers associated with the enforcement constraint which drives down
the marginal benefit of employees to firms. Financial frictions generate an additional
wedge between the wage bill per worker and the marginal productivity of each worker Fn.
Capital is more ‘valuable’ to the firm than an additional worker in this environment since
capital has the additional benefit of loosening the enforcement constraint. This makes
both investment and hours per worker sensitive to shocks originating in the financial
sector or from TFP. Despite improving some labor market variables’ volatilities via
financial shocks, we are still quite far off from replicating the volatility displayed in the
data, especially for vacancies.
2.5 Conclusion
Does the incorporation of financial shocks into a standard matching model better our
understanding of fluctuations in hours, employment, and wages? Our analysis suggests
that there are gains to be made by accounting for such shocks in a standard matching
model. We proposed a model that uses Andolfatto as a our benchmark matching model
and incorporate financial frictions and shocks into the environment similar to JQ. Within
our model, we show that the credit channel has marked impacts on key labor variables
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via the shifting of bargaining power from workers to firms through the effective shadow
price on the enforcement constraint.
Comparing our results to the Andolfatto model, calibrated to hit the same targets,
demonstrates that our model can better replicate business cycle moments. Moreover,
a variance decomposition of the shocks suggests that financial shocks play an impor-
tant role in the fluctuation of both hours per worker and the labor share. While our
results still support the notion that business cycle fluctuations are still largely due to
productivity shocks, it also suggests that future research that employs a matching model
framework should seriously consider the incorporation of financial shocks as well as the
intensive margin to account for movements in key labor market variables. Without the
incorporation of financial shocks, movements in employment, hours per worker, and the
labor share are relatively muted over the business cycle.
Chapter 3
Wage Negotiations in
Multi-worker Firms and
Stochastic Bargaining Powers of
Existing Workers
3.1 Introduction
In literature, two different bargaining protocols are used in the search and matching
model where a firm hires more than one worker and the firm faces diminishing marginal
product of labor (MPL). One is the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) type bargaining protocol
as in Hawkins (2011), Elsby and Michaels (2013), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), and
Fujita and Nakajima (2014). In these papers, a breakdown of a negotiation with a
marginal worker negatively affects the bargaining position of the firm with other workers
(one fewer workers) since MPL is higher with one fewer workers. The other is a standard
bargaining protocol as in Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and Cheron and Langot
(2004). In these papers, a breakdown of a negotiation does not affect the bargaining
with other workers because they implicitly assume that MPL does not change when
the firm bargains with other workers. I interpret these two bargaining protocols as two
extreme cases: in terms of relative bargaining powers between other workers and a firm.
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I will call other workers existing workers. If existing workers have all the bargaining
powers1 , then the firm has to fully internalize the negative effects from the breakdown
of the negotiation with a marginal worker. However, if the firm has all the bargaining
powers2 , the firm does not internalize any negative effects from the breakdown by
ignoring that MPL is higher with one fewer workers. Given the two extreme cases, I am
looking at cases between the two extremes by introducing stochastic bargaining powers
of existing workers.
In this paper, when Nash bargaining with a marginal worker breaks down, a firm
negotiates wages with existing workers. The bargaining powers of existing workers
are stochastic. Due to diminishing MPL, the breakdown of the negotiation with the
marginal worker negatively affects the bargaining position of the firm with existing
workers (one fewer workers) since MPL is higher with one fewer workers. How much
the firm internalizes this negative effect depends on the stochastic bargaining powers of
existing workers which can be identified through labor share data. During expansions,
it is relatively difficult for the firm to hire workers, so existing workers might have higher
bargaining powers. If the firm fails to hire a marginal worker due to a breakdown of
negotiations, the firm has to pay higher wages to existing workers. Since the failure to
hire marginal workers is more costly during expansions, the firm has more incentives to
hire marginal workers by offering higher wages to forgo the higher cost associated with
the breakdown. During recessions, the opposite happens. Through this mechanism,
the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers provide an additional margin to
increase the volatility of labor market variables. The calibrated model generates more
volatile total hours, employment, hours per worker while labor share overshoots in
response to productivity shocks as documented in R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis
(2010). In particular, the volatility of employment in the model is similar to the actual
US data. In contrast to the prediction of R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), in
which the effect of productivity shocks is dampened when labor share overshoots due to
huge wealth effects from the overshooting property of labor share, this paper presents
a model in which the labor share overshoots in response to productivity shocks and the
volatility of employment closely matches that of US data.
1 This is my interpretation of the Stole and Zwiebel type bargaining protocol
2 This is my interpretation of the standard bargaining protocol
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Table 3.1: Business cycle moments in data and models over 1960:Q1-2012:Q1
σx%
(
σx
σOutput
)
ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Data Andolfatto KL Data Andolfatto KL Data Andolfatto KL
Output 1.54 (1.00) 1.31 (1.00) 1.31 (1.00) - - - 0.86 0.82 0.82
Total Hours 1.38 (0.90) 0.70 (0.53) 0.70 (0.53) 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.91
Employment 1.00 (0.65) 0.68 (0.52) 0.69 (0.53) 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.91 0.89 0.88
Hours per Worker 0.49 (0.32) 0.19 (0.15) 0.19 (0.15) 0.74 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.58
Wages 0.91 (0.59) 0.62 (0.47) 0.64 (0.49) 0.34 0.94 0.94 0.69 0.65 0.64
Labor Productivity 0.82 (0.53) 0.72 (0.55) 0.72 (0.55) 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.57 0.62 0.62
Labor Share 0.74 (0.48) 0.12 (0.09) 0.09 (0.07) -0.08 -0.72 -0.70 0.78 0.51 0.50
Vacancies 13.23 (8.59) 3.65 (2.79) 3.69 (2.82) 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.91 0.54 0.54
1) All data are in logs and filtered using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
2) In the Andolfatto model, I use the standard bargaining protocol
3) In the KL model, I use the Stole and Zwiebel type bargaining protocol
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This paper is related to several studies which can be classified into three groups.
First, the baseline model is based on Andolfatto (1996). His model embeds search and
matching framework into an otherwise standard RBC model, and has both extensive
margins and intensive margins. By incorporating search and matching framework in
labor markets, the model improves the standard RBC model along several dimensions.
However, the volatility of labor market variables is still far lower than that of actual
data. The Andolfatto model also has highly pro-cyclical real wages and labor pro-
ductivity, which have weakly pro-cyclical counterparts in actual data. Several papers
have addressed these problems. Nakajima (2012) analyzes several volatility problems
by explicitly distinguishing between leisure and unemployment benefits for the outside
options of households. This distinction is consistent with the calibration proposed by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the main focus of Nakajima (2012) is un-
employment and vacancies than employment and hours per worker, which are my main
interest. Cheron and Langot (2004) address the second failure of Andolfatto (1996) by
using non-separable preference between consumptions and leisure such that the outside
options of households can move counter-cyclically. This proposal results in less pro-
cyclical real wages and labor productivity. However, this paper is not interested in the
volatility of labor market variables in general.
The second branch of papers related to my paper is literature on the Stole and
Zwiebel type bargaining and its applications to business cycle dynamics3 . Krause and
Lubik (2007) (KL, henceforth) incorporate the Stole and Zwiebel type bargaining pro-
tocol into a simple RBC search and matching model to evaluate the quantitative effects
of the bargaining protocol on business cycle dynamics. They show that the aggregate
effects of the bargaining protocol are negligible. Table 3.1 summarizes business cycle
moments for the modified KL model4 . The performance of KL model is almost the
same as the Andolfatto model, and both models perform poorly in replicating moments
3 Hawkins (2011), Elsby and Michaels (2013), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), and Fujita and
Nakajima (2014) also study the labor marker fluctuations with the Stole and Zwiebel type bargaining,
but the main focus of these papers is unemployment and vacancies than employment and hours per
worker.
4 The original model in KL does not have capital and intensive margins. Therefore, I add the Stole
and Zwiebel type bargaining to the Andolfatto model rather than to the original model in KL in order
to assure fair comparison of the two models.
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along several dimensions. In contrast to KL, this paper introduces the stochastic bar-
gaining with existing workers when the match with a marginal worker fails, and the
bargaining powers of existing workers vary stochastically. The time-varying incentives
to hire workers for firms, resulting from the stochastic bargaining, provide a new margin
to increase the volatility of labor market variables. Later, it turns out that Andolfatto
and KL are two extreme cases where bargaining powers of existing workers are fixed at
0, and 1, respectively, in the baseline model.
Lastly, this paper is also related to papers studying labor share. Recently, R´ıos-Rull
and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) document several properties of labor share dynamics
based on US data. In particular, they propose redistributive shocks that can be identified
by using labor share data in the US, and point out the importance of the dynamic
property of labor share (overshooting). They showed that labor share overshoots in
response to productivity shocks, and the dynamic overshooting response of labor share
drastically dampens the role of productivity shocks on labor markets due to huge wealth
effects. My model also generates the overshooting property of labor share, but total
hours, employment, and hours per worker are still more volatile than the benchmark
Andolfatto model. Different from R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), the search
and matching framework weakens wealth effects from the overshooting of labor share
and more incentives for firms to hire workers offset the huge reduction of total hours.
The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, I incorporate the stochastic
bargaining with existing workers into the Andolfatto model, which has both extensive
and intensive margins in the labor market5 . To the best of my knowledge, I first study
the effect of the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers on wage negotiations
in multi-worker firms. The bargaining powers of existing workers can be time-varying
because when labor markets are tighter, mostly in booms, existing workers are more
valuable as the firm will have difficulty finding new workers. However, when the labor
market is less tight, mostly in recessions, existing workers become less attractive to
firms, which could easily find new workers. This reason makes the bargaining powers
of existing workers possibly pro-cyclical with some lags. Another possible explanation
5 I include intensive margins for two reasons. First, labor share is important for identifying bar-
gaining shocks, and for the labor share in the model to be consistent with actual data, I need to include
intensive margins. Second, bargaining shocks directly affect intensive margins because the bargaining
powers of existing workers affect the relative usefulness of intensive and extensive margins for the firm.
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could be related to the entry and exit of firms. In booms, firms compete with each
other because of higher entry rates of new firms and lower exit rates of existing firms.
These situations reduce the monopolistic or bargaining powers of firms over existing
workers. However, during recessions, the opposite happens. Given this explanation, the
bargaining powers of existing workers move pro-cyclically with some lags based on the
pro-cyclical entry and the counter-cyclical exit rates. The inclusion of the stochastic
bargaining with existing workers improves the capacity of the standard RBC search
and matching model, especially in the volatility of total hours, employment, hours per
worker, and labor share.
Second, I identify bargaining shocks by using labor share data. I provide the link
between the bargaining powers of workers and the movement of labor share in the US.
In addition, my model generates an overshooting property of labor share, but the effect
of productivity shocks on labor market variables are still significant in contrast to the
prediction of R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010). In their model, the effect of
productivity shocks is dampened when labor share overshoots because of huge wealth
effects from the overshooting property. In contrast to their model, the baseline model
has a search and matching framework, and the nature of this framework weakens wealth
effects resulting from the overshooting of labor share. On top of these differences, more
incentives for firms to hire workers offset the huge reduction of total hours in booms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline
model with the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers. Section 3 discusses the
calibration of the baseline model. Section 4 shows quantitative analysis of the model.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of the baseline model. Finally, Section 6 concludes
and proposes the further research.
3.2 Model
I develop a model based on a standard RBC search and matching model, the Andolfatto
(1996) model. The main difference between this paper and the Andolfatto model is the
outside option of a firm in the bargaining with a marginal worker. I explicitly consider
the outside option of a firm when the firm bargains with a marginal worker. The
outside option of the firm is bargaining with existing workers and producing goods with
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them. The issue with bargaining with existing workers is the wages the firm pays.
In this paper, these wages depend on the bargaining powers of existing workers. If
the bargaining powers of existing workers are high, then existing workers will receive
higher wages, but if the bargaining powers of existing workers are low, then they will
receive lower wages. Note that these wages are not realized if the match with the
marginal worker is successful while they still affect the equilibrium wages. In this paper,
matches are always successful because the surplus of a new match is always positive.
Therefore, wages bargained with existing workers would not be realized in equilibrium.
Furthermore, I assume the bargaining powers of existing workers stochastically evolves.
Except for the stochastic bargaining with existing workers, the baseline model is similar
to Andolfatto (1996), and Cheron and Langot (2004).
3.2.1 Matching
I assume that the period in the model is a quarter. The timing of my model is as
follows: (1) shocks are realized, (2) wages and hours per worker are bargained over
with marginal workers, (3) if matches are not successful, the firm bargains wages with
existing workers (4) workers are matched with the firm (5) production takes place and
the firm posts vacancies, and (6) separations occur.
Since labor markets are frictional, the unemployed search for jobs and firms post
vacancies to hire workers. The number of matches is determined by constant returns
to scale matching function M = M (V, 1−N), which depends on the total number of
vacancies, V , and the total number of the unemployed, U ≡ 1−N . For later use, I define
θ = V/ (1−N) as market tightness in labor markets. Also, I define the job-finding rate
Ψ (θ) ≡ M/ (1−N) = M (θ, 1) and the job-filling rate Φ (θ) ≡ M/V = M (1, 1/θ).
Finally, I assume that workers are separated at the exogenous and constant rate χ ∈
(0, 1). Therefore, we have the following law of motion of total employment.
N
′
= (1− χ)N +M (V, 1−N)
3.2.2 Household
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households of measure one. The
measure of members in each household is also normalized to 1. The aggregate states
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in this economy are given by S = {z, γ;K,N}, where z is the aggregate productivity
and γ is the bargaining power of existing workers, which varies stochastically. K is the
aggregate capital stock, and N is total employment. The individual state variables of
the household are sH = {a, n}, where a is the amount of assets they hold and n is the
measure of the employed in household. I can write the household problem as follows:
Ω (S, sH) = max
c,a
′ u (c) + nu
l (1− h (S, sH)) + (1− n)ul (1) + βE
[
Ω
(
S
′
, s
′
H
)]
s.t.
c+ a
′
+ T (S) = w (S, sH)h (S, sH)n+ (1− n) b+ (1 + r(S)) a+ Π (S)
n
′
= (1− χ)n+ p (S) (1− n)
S′ = G (S)
where u (c) is utility from consumption, a is the assets household holds, ul (·) is utility
from leisure, T (S) is the lump-sum tax, Π (S) = F (z, k, nh) − w (S, sF )h (S, sF )n −
(r (S) + δ) k − κv is the dividend which will be defined in the firm’s problem. p (S) =
M/ (1−N) is the job-finding rate and G (S) is the law of motion of aggregate state
variables. Household takes wages w (S, sH) and hours per worker h (S, sH) as given.
They are jointly determined via Nash bargaining.
The household consumes (c), accumulate assets (a) which they rent to a firm, and
supplies labor. The n fraction of members in each household is matched with the firm
and employed. And the 1 − n fraction of members is unemployed, searches for jobs,
and they collect unemployment benefits (b) from the government. I assume that there
is no search cost, and so every member who is not employed searches for the job.6 I
also assume that there is a perfect insurance for unemployment within the household as
noted in Andolfatto (1996).7 As a result, every member receives the same consumption
level. Note that this implies unemployed members are better off than those who are
employed since they receive the same consumption level but the unemployed enjoy a
full amount of leisure.8
6 In this sense, u in my model is the non-employed. I do not distinguish between the unemployed
and the non-employed like Andolfatto (1996). Since the measure of the unemployment rate in model
and data are inconsistent, I do not report any statistics regarding unemployment in this paper.
7 Separable utility functions over consumption and leisure satisfy this assumption.
8 I can relax this assumption. As noted in Cheron and Langot (2004), Nakajima (2012), if I
use non-separable utility functions over consumption and leisure, the employed receive higher levels
of consumption than the unemployed. Consequently, the employed are better off in equilibrium. If I
use non-separable utility functions, the performance of the model would be better, especially for labor
productivity and real wages. However, I do not use these utility functions because I prefer to setup the
baseline model in a more parsimonious way.
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The first order conditions of household’s problem give9
E
[
β
u
′
c
uc
(
1 + r
′)]
= 1
This is a standard Euler equation for the household.
3.2.3 Firm
There exists a representative firm. The firm produces goods using a constant returns to
scale production technology F (z, k, nh), where z is the aggregate productivity . Given
the aggregate state S, and the individual state variable of the firm sF = {n}, I can
write firm’s recursive problem as follows:
J (S, sF ) = max
v,k,n′
Π(S) + E
[
m′
(
S, S′
)
J
(
S′, s′F
)]
= max
v,k,n′
F (z, k, nh)− w (S, sF )h (S, sF )n− (r (S) + δ) k − κv + E
[
m′
(
S, S′
)
J
(
S′, s′F
)]
s.t.
n′ = (1− χ)n+ q (S) v
S′ = G (S)
where m
′ (
S, S
′)
= βuc
(
c
(
S
′))
/uc (c (S)) is the stochastic discount factor, κ is the cost of
posting vacancies, and q (S) = M/V is the job-filling rate. Again, G (S) is the law of
motion of aggregate state variables. The firm hires workers and rent capital from the
households, and posts vacancies to hire more workers in the next period. Firms also take
wages w (S, sF ) and hours per worker h (S, sF ) as given. They are jointly determined via
Nash bargaining. From the first order conditions, we have two equilibrium conditions.
r = Fk − δ
κ = qE
[
m
′
J
′
n
]
The first condition is an equation for the equilibrium rental rate. The second equation
is a job creation condition, which implies the firm posts vacancies up to the point
where the marginal cost of posting vacancies equals to the value of an additional worker
discounted by the probability that the firm meets a marginal worker.
3.2.4 The bargaining with a marginal worker
As stated before, wages, w, and hours per workers, h, are jointly determined via Nash
bargaining between a worker and a firm each period. Formally, Nash bargaining problem
can be written as follows:
9 I will drop state variables for simple notations.
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(w, h) = argmax
w,h
(Ωm)µ (Jm)1−µ
= argmax
w,h
(
V E − V U
uc
)µ(
lim
∆→0
J [n+ ∆]− JB [n]
∆
)1−µ
The first component, Ωm, denotes the marginal value of employment for the worker10
and the second component, Jm, represents the marginal value of an additional employee
to the firm. µ is the bargaining power of a marginal worker. V E is the value of
employment for the worker and V U is the value of unemployment for the worker, which
is the outside option of the worker. J [n+ ∆] is the value of the firm when the match
with the (n+ ∆)-th worker is successful and JB [n] is the value of the firm when the
negotiation breaks down, which is the outside option of the firm. The only difference
between the bargaining problem in this paper and the standard Nash bargaining is the
outside option of the firm, JB [n], which is defined within the marginal value of an
additional employee to the firm.
The marginal value of employment for the worker
I can define the marginal value of employment for the worker as follows.
Ωm =
V E − V U
uc
≡
[
wh+
u(c)
uc
+
ul (1− h)
uc
+ (1− χ)βE
[
V E
′
uc
]
+ χβE
[
V U
′
uc
]]
−
[
b+
u(c)
uc
+
ul (1)
uc
+ pβE
[
V E
′
uc
]
+ (1− p)βE
[
V U
′
uc
]]
= wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)βE
[
V E
′ − V U′
uc
]
Note that the bracket in the first line is the value of working which includes the wage bill,
utility from consumption, utility from leisure, and the continuation value of employment
for the worker. The bracket in the second line is the outside option of the worker which
consists of unemployment benefits, utility from consumption, utility from leisure, and
the continuation value of unemployment for the worker. From the value function of the
household, we also have
Ωn
uc
= wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)E
[
β
Ω′n
uc
]
10 Note that this value is discounted by the marginal utility of consumption so that the unit of this
term can be converted to consumption goods
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From the above equations, we have
Ωm =
Ωn
uc
Therefore, the marginal value of employment for the worker that I defined before is the
same as the partial derivative of the value function of the household with respect to the
number of the employed in household, n.
The marginal value of an additional employee to the firm
The marginal value of an additional employee to the firm is not trivial because the
outside option of the firm can be defined in different ways. The outside option of the
firm in the bargaining with a marginal worker is bargaining wages with existing workers
and producing goods with them. The key component of the outside option for the firm
is the wages the firm pays to existing workers. Let we be the wages negotiated between
the firm and existing workers when the match with a marginal worker breaks down11
. I can define the value of an additional employee to the firm, Jm, as follows:
Jm ≡ lim
∆→0
J [n+ ∆]− JB [n]
∆
= lim
∆→0
1
∆
[(
F (z, k, (n+ ∆)h)− w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)h− (r + δ) k − κv + βE
[
u
′
c
uc
J
[
(n+ ∆)
′]])
−
(
F (z, k, nh)− we [n]nh− (r + δ) k − κv + βE
[
u′c
uc
JB
[
n′
]])]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
[w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)nh− we [n]nh]
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
J [n+ ∆] denotes the value of the firm when the match with a marginal worker is suc-
cessful12 . I assume that if the match is successful today, then it is also successful
afterward. JB [n] denotes the value of the firm when the negotiation with the marginal
worker breaks down, which is the outside option of the firm. In this case, the firm do
not hire new workers and continues to produce goods with existing workers by contin-
uing wage negotiations with them afterward. w [n+ ∆] is Nash bargained wages with
11 As I mentioned before, these wages, we, would not be realized in equilibrium. These wages show
up in the outside option of the firm, but the match with a marginal worker is always successful in this
paper because the match surplus is always positive. Consequently, the wages for existing workers are
not realized in equilibrium while they still affect equilibrium wages and other variables.
12 I drop aggregate state variables for simple notations here
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the (n+ ∆)-th worker and we [n] is wages for existing workers when the match breaks
down. The second line is the value of the firm when the firm hires 4 more workers,
which includes the level of output less wage bills with workers including newly hired
ones and costs of posting vacancies, and the continuation value of the firm. The third
line is the outside option of the firm, which consists of the level of output less wage bills
with existing workers and costs of posting vacancies, and the continuation value of the
firm. The derivation of the last equation can be found in the Appendix C.
If the firm has all the bargaining powers, then the firm does not internalize any
negative effects from the breakdown of the negotiation with the marginal worker by
ignoring that MPL is higher with one fewer workers. In this case, the firm pays existing
workers the same wages as the firm would have paid the marginal worker . Then, we
have we [n] = w [n+ ∆].
Proposition 1
Suppose we [n] = w [n+ ∆]. Then, the marginal value of an additional employee to the
firm reduces to
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
Proof. See Appendix C. 
This is the standard marginal value of an additional employee to the firm in literature
where wages are determined via the standard bargaining protocol as in Merz (1995),
Andofatto (1996), and Cheron and Langot (2004). Also, note that this equation can be
directly derived by differentiating the firm’s value function J with respect to n, under
the assumption that wages are not a function of n.
On the other hand, if existing workers have all the bargaining powers, then the firm
should fully internalize the negative effects from the breakdown. In this case, the firm
continues Nash bargaining with one fewer workers, and we have we = w [n], where w [n]
is Nash bargained wages with n-th worker.
75
Proposition 2
Suppose we [n] = w [n]. Then, the marginal value of an additional employee to the firm
reduces to
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h− ∂w [n]
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
Proof. See Appendix C. 
This is the marginal value of an additional employee to the firm when wages are
determined via the Stole and Zwiebel bargaining protocol as in Hawkins (2011), Elsby
and Michaels (2013), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), and Fujita and Nakajima (2014).
Note that this equation can be directly derived by differentiating the firm’s value func-
tion J with respect to n, under the assumption that wages are an explicit function of
n. The partial derivative term ∂w∂n will be turned out to be negative later.
In this paper, I assume that wages, we [n], are determined based on the bargaining
powers of existing workers, γ. More specifically, I assume we [n] ≡ γw [n]+(1− γ)w [n+ ∆].
For example, if existing workers have higher bargaining powers, they receive wages more
close to w [n], and if they have lower bargaining powers, they receive wages more close
to w [n+ ∆].
Proposition 3
Suppose we [n] = γw [n] + (1− γ)w [n+ ∆]. Then, the marginal value of an additional
employee to the firm reduces to
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h− γ ∂w [n]
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
Proof. See Appendix C. 
By construction, if γ = 0, then Proposition 3 reduces to Proposition 1 (standard bar-
gaining protocol), and if γ = 1, then Proposition 3 reduces to Proposition 2 (Stole and
Zweibel bargaining protocol). Note that the marginal value of an additional employee
to the firm depends on the stochastic bargaining power of existing workers through
the term, γ ∂w[n]∂n nh. This is the main contribution of this paper. The inclusion of the
stochastic bargaining bargaining with existing workers provides an additional margin
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to increase the volatility of labor market variables basically through the term, γ ∂w[n]∂n nh
within the the marginal value of an additional employee to the firm.
Stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers, γ
The bargaining power of existing workers, γ ∈ [0, 1], can be time-varying because when
labor markets are tighter, mostly in booms, existing workers are more valuable as the
firm will have difficulty finding new workers. However, when the labor market is less
tight, mostly in recessions, existing workers become less attractive to firms, which could
easily find new workers. This reason makes the bargaining power of existing workers
possibly pro-cyclical with some lags. Another possible explanation could be related to
the entry and exit of firms over business cycles, which are abstracted from in this paper.
In booms, several firms compete with a specific firm because of higher entry rates of new
firms and lower exit rates of existing firms. These situations reduce the monopolistic
or bargaining powers of the firm over existing workers. However, during recessions, the
opposite happens. Given this explanation, the bargaining power of existing workers
moves pro-cyclically with some lags based on the pro-cyclical entry and the counter-
cyclical exit rates.
Since the baseline model does not have any endogenous mechanism to generate time-
varying bargaining power of existing workers, I will assume that γ varies stochastically
and call innovations to γ bargaining shocks. I will show, in the calibration section,
that bargaining shocks can be identified by using labor share data from US once we
have the solution to the first order differential equation from the wage bill equation.
I set a fixed bargaining power for marginal workers, µ, while I allow the bargaining
powers of existing workers, γ, to vary over time. In the robustness section, I show the
time-varying bargaining power of a marginal worker is quantitatively not an important
factor given the constructed shock series of bargaining power of a marginal worker, µt,
by using labor share data. I will discuss it more in the robustness section.
Solutions to the bargaining with a marginal worker
Now, we turn to the bargaining problem which is the same as standard Nash bargaining
given the marginal value of employment for the worker and the marginal value of an
additional employee to the firm.
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Ωm = wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)E
[
β
u
′
c
uc
Ωm
′
]
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− wh− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
Given the bargaining power of the marginal worker, µ ∈ [0, 1], and the bargaining
powers of existing workers , γ ∈ [0, 1], wages and hours per worker are determined via
the following standard bargaining problem.
(w, h) = argmax
w,h
(Ωm)µ (Jm)1−µ
I will write w instead of w [n] for simple notations hereafter. From the first order
conditions with respect to w and h, we have the following two equations.
wh = µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+
V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
ul(1−h)(1− h)
uc
= Fnh + γ
∂w
∂n
n
where Fnh =
∂F (z,k,nh)
∂(nh)
13 . The first equation is the wage bill equation and the
second equation is an intra-temporal condition for hours per worker. Note that we have
additional terms, γ ∂w∂nnh and γ
∂w
∂nn in the both equations compared to the standard
bargaining case. The term ∂w∂n can be calculated by solving the first order differential
equation, which will be defined from the wage bill equation shortly. The first equation is
similar to the wage bill equation as in Cheron and Langot (2004) except for the second
term in the right hand side, γ ∂w∂nnh. I can rewrite the wage bill equation as the first order
differential equation with respect to wages w. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production
function, F (z, k, nh) = ezkα (nh)1−α, the solution to the first order differential equation
is given as
w = µ
(
(1− α)
1− µγαe
zkαh−αn−α +
V
1−N κh
−1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
h−1
From the above equation, we have
∂w
∂n
= −µα (1− α)
1− µγα e
zkαh−αn−α−1 < 0
γ
∂w
∂n
= −µγα (1− α)
1− µγα e
zkαh−αn−α−1 < 0
Using the derivative term, we can rewrite two important conditions as follows:
ul(1−h)(1− h)
uc
=
(1− α)
1− µγαe
zkα (nh)−α
13 Following Andolfatto (1996), it is assumed that each worker is so small such that Fnh =
∂F (z,k,nh)
∂(nh)
is taken as given by both the worker and the firm during the bargaining.
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wh = µ
(
(1− α)
1− µγαe
zkαh1−αn−α +
V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
Stochastic bargaining power of existing workers, γ, shows up in the equations for both
intensive and extensive margins. This implies that bargaining shocks possibly increase
the volatility of both margins. If γ = 0, we have similar conditions as in literature which
uses standard bargaining protocol.
ul(1−h)(1− h)
uc
= (1− α) ezkα (nh)−α
wh = µ
(
(1− α) ezkαh1−αn−α + V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
If γ = 1, the the conditions become similar to ones in KL14 .
ul(1−h)(1− h)
uc
=
(1− α)
1− µα e
zkα (nh)−α
wh = µ
(
(1− α)
1− µα e
zkαh1−αn−α +
V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
3.2.5 Government
The government simply raises revenue in order to pay out unemployment benefits b to
unemployed members within the household. Therefore, the government budget con-
straint is
T (S) = (1− n) b
3.2.6 Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions; the household’s value function
Ω (S, sH) , the household’s policy functions c (S, sH) , a
′ (S, sH) , the firm’s value function
J (S, sF ), the firm’s policy functions v (S, sf ) , k (S, sf ) , aggregate prices r (S) ,m (S, S
′),
taxes T (S), dividends Π (S), and the law of motion for aggregate state variables G (S)
such that
(1) Household’s policy functions solve the household’s problem
(2) Firm’s policy functions solve the firm’s problem
(3) m (S, S′) = βu(c (S′))/uc(c (S))
(4) Wages and hours per worker (w (S) , h (S)) are the solution to the bargaining
problem
(5) All markets clear
(6) The government budget constraint is balanced
(7) The law of motion G (S) is consistent with individual decisions
14 Since KL does not have intensive margins, they do not have equation for intensive margins.
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3.3 Calibration
First, I define the matching function and the aggregate production function to be
F (z, k, nh) = ezk (nh)1−α
M = ωV ψ (1−N)1−ψ
where α ∈ (0, 1) , ψ ∈ (0, 1). I specify the household’s utility function as follows
u (c) = log (c)
ul(1− h) = φe (1− h)
1−η
1− η
Including the parameters in the functions defined above, I have 19 parameters to be cal-
ibrated. Parameters can be categorized into three groups based on the way to calibrate
them. The first set of parameters are predetermined parameters outside the model. The
second set of parameters are parameters for shock processes, which will be estimated
from constructed shock processes from US data. The last group of parameters is param-
eters to be determined in the model by using the steady state conditions and relevant
targets.
3.3.1 Predetermined parameters
I basically follow Andolfatto (1996) for the discount factor β = 0.99, the separation
rate χ = 0.15, the depreciation rate δ = 0.025, the Cobb Douglas parameter for capital
α = 0.36, and the coefficient for vacancies in the matching function ψ = 0.60. Note that
since the labor market is not competitive in this paper, I cannot use labor share data
to calibrate α. Table 3.2 summarizes predetermined parameters.
Table 3.2: Predetermined parameters
Parameters Description Value Source
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual rate: 4%
χ Separation rate 0.15 Andolfatto (1996)
δ Depreciation rate 0.025 Andolfatto (1996)
α CD parameter for capital 0.36 Andolfatto (1996)
ψ Coef. for vacancies in matching function 0.60 Andolfatto (1996)
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3.3.2 Parameters for the shock processes
Productivity shocks can be constructed as a series of the measure Solow residual. From
the aggregate production function, we have
zˆt = yˆt − αkˆt − (1− α) nˆt − (1− α) hˆt
where hats denote log-deviations from a linear trend for each variable over the period
1960:Q1-2012:Q1. I normalize z¯ = 1.
For bargaining shocks, we can use the solution to the first order differential equation
we solved before
∂w
∂n
= −µα (1− α)
1− µγα zk
αh−αn−α−1
∂w
∂n
n
w
= −µα (1− α)
1− µγα
y
nhw
= −µα (1− α)
1− µγα
1
labor share
labor share =
µα (1− α)
1− µγα
1
(−w,n)
where w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw .15 I assume the elasticity w,n does not move much around the
steady-state value w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw = −µα(1−α)1−µγ¯α y¯n¯h¯w¯ , and I will show this assumption is
innocuous in the quantitative analysis section. From equation (36), I can construct
series of γt given series of the labor share data from US.
(labor share)t =
µα (1− α)
1− µγtα
1
(−w,n)
γt =
1
µα
− (1− α)
(labor share)t (−w,n)
The series of labor share are constructed from US data. The detail can be found in
the appendix C. Given signs of parameters and w,n < 0, there exists the positive
relationship between bargaining shocks γt and labor share. This implies that the higher
labor share is related to the higher bargaining powers of existing workers.
∂ (labor share)
∂γ
=
(µα)2 (1− α)
(1− µγα)2 (−w,n)
> 0
Based on several information criteria such as FPE, AIC, HQIC, and SBIC, I specify
VAR(1) system for detrended shock series zˆ, νˆ to estimate shock processes.(
zˆ′
νˆ′
)
=
(
ρzz ργz
ρzγ ργγ
)(
zˆ
γˆ
)
+
(
ε′z
ε′γ
)
(
εz
εγ
)
∼ N
(
0,
(
σ2zz σzγ
σzγ σ
2
γγ
))
15 Note that w,n < 0.
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Table 3.3: Shock processes
Parameters Value Remarks
ρzz 0.9616 P-value = 0.000
ργz -0.0053 P-value = 0.169
ρzγ 0.3937 P-value = 0.000
ργγ 0.9336 P-value = 0.000
σz 0.0070 -
σγ 0.0399 -
σzγ -0.0001 ρ (εz, εγ) =-0.3643
Table 3.3 summarizes parameters estimated using VAR(1) system above. All coeffi-
cient parameters except for ργz are significant. Note that we have ρzγ = 0.3937, which
means today’s productivity shocks increase tomorrow’s bargaining powers of existing
workers. This is key mechanism that the inclusion of the stochastic bargaining makes
total hours, employment and hours per workers more volatile in addition to productivity
shocks.
3.3.3 Parameters determined using targets
Table 3.4: Targets
Target Value Source
Frisch elasticity of hours for those employed 0.50 Andolfatto (1996)
Steady-state employment to population ratio 0.60 Data (1960:Q1-2012:Q1)
Steady-state hours per worker16 0.39 Data (1960:Q1-2012:Q1)
Steady-state job-filling rate 0.90 Andolfatto (1996)
Vacancy expenditure to output ratio17 0.0218 Silva & Toledo (2009)
Replacement ratio 0.40 Shimer (2005)
Bargaining power of a marginal worker, µ = γ¯18 µ -
I choose the remaining 7 parameters using equilibrium conditions in the steady state
and targets from the literature and data from US over 1960:Q1-2012:Q1. The targets I
used are summarized in Table 3.3. First, I set Frisch elasticity of hours for employed to
0.50, the steady state job-filling rate to 0.90 as in Andolfatto (1996), which is common
across the literature. According to Silva and Toledo (2009), the average cost of time
spent hiring one worker is approximately 3.6%-4.3% of total labor costs. I take the
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Table 3.5: Parameters determined using targets
Parameters Description Baseline
η Curvature parameter for leisure 3.0940
φe Scale parameter for leisure 0.9136
κ Cost of posting vacancies 0.1905
ω Matching efficiency 0.5156
b Unemployment Benefits 0.4080
µ Bargaining power of a marginal worker 0.5697
γ Bargaining power of existing workers 0.5697
target the mid point of those range, 3.9%, which gives vacancy expenditure to output
ratio κvy = 0.0218.
19 . I use 40 percent as the value of unemployment benefits following
Shimer (2005). In Shimer, this value implicitly includes the value of leisure, but in this
paper I explicitly consider the leisure in the utility function, so unemployment benefits,
b, are purely unemployment benefits as in Nakajima (2012). Targets and parameters
determined using these targets are listed in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 respectively. I set
the mean value of the bargaining power of existing workers, γ, to be 0.5605 which is
the same as the bargaining power of a marginal worker, µ, calibrated in the model.20
Since the parameter γ is a free parameter and there is no clear way to pin down
this parameter, I calibrate it such that γ = µ in the steady state. As I will discuss
in the robustness section later, lower values of γ generates more volatile labor market
variables. However, I set γ = µ = 0.5697 which gives almost the least volatility among
γ ∈ (0, 1) in the baseline model. In this regard, I think the choice of γ = 0.5697 is
innocuous and parsimonious. Also, note that calibrated value for the bargaining power
of a marginal worker, µ, is 0.5697, which guarantees quantitative results of the baseline
model are not a direct result from a low value of µ as noted in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008).
19 This value is calculated based on job-filling rate Φ = 0.90 and labor share = 0.62.
20 The mean of the bargaining power of existing workers, ν, and the bargaining power of a new
worker, µ, are jointly determined in the steady state.
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3.4 Quantitative analysis
Figure 3.1: IRFs to the positive one standard deviation bargaining shock
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(c) Wages
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(d) Hours per worker
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(f) Labor share
3.4.1 Impulse response functions for positive bargaining shocks
Figure 3.1 shows the impulse response of key labor market variables to the positive
one standard deviation bargaining shock. When positive bargaining shocks hit the
economy, the bargaining power of existing workers instantly increases. Since bargaining
powers of existing workers are higher then before, a firm has more incentives to hire
marginal workers by offering higher wages to forgo the higher cost associated with the
failure to hire marginal workers. Therefore, the firm instantly posts more vacancies, and
employment increases one period later due to the nature of search frictions. Since the
firm pays higher wages, hours per worker increase and higher total hours yield higher
outputs in the equilibrium. Higher employment, hours per worker, and wages results in
an increase in labor share by offsetting an increase in outputs.
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3.4.2 Business cycle moments
Table 3.6 summarizes quantitative results of the baseline model. I compare the baseline
model to the Andolfatto model to see what gains and what shortcomings the inclusion
of stochastic bargaining and bargaining shocks gives. Again, all data are in log and
HP filtered. First of all, the baseline model generates a high (relative) volatility of
employment, 0.67, which almost close to the actual U.S. data, 0.65. This is a remarkable
success and the main contribution in this paper. Since employment is very volatile, total
hours is much volatile than the Andolfatto model. Hours per worker and vacancies are
slightly more volatile than Andolfatto, but the differences are small. The moments for
labor share are almost similar to the actual US data. This result might be a direct result
of the identification strategy for bargaining shocks from labor share data. However, the
moments for labor share in the model, along with the overshooting property I will discuss
shortly, justify the assumption for the identification of bargaining shocks; w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw
does not move much around the steady state.
The main mechanism generates more volatile labor market variables is that the
impact of productivity shocks is amplified by changes in bargaining powers of existing
workers in addition to the impact of each shock. Recall that the estimated parameter
for ρzv is 0.3937, which means that as the productivity shocks today positively affect the
bargaining powers tomorrow, and as the bargaining power of existing workers increases,
the firm will have more incentives to hire marginal workers by offering higher wages to
forgo the higher cost associated with the failure to hire marginal workers. This dynamic
interaction between productivity shocks and bargaining shocks amplifies the volatility
of labor market variables, especially employment.
I now consider shortcomings of the baseline model relative to Andolfatto. The
baseline model generates the higher volatility of labor productivity, weak pro-cyclicality
of total hours, employment and hours per worker. Also, labor productivity is more
persistent and vacancies are less persistent than the Andolfatto model and actual US
data. Despite of these shortcomings, the baseline model performs better than Andolfatto
model in general.
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Table 3.6: Business cycle moments in data and models over 1960:Q1-2012:Q1
σx%
(
σx
σOutput
)
ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Data Baseline Andolfatto Data Baseline Andolfatto Data Baseline Andolfatto
Output 1.54 (1.00) 1.36 (1.00) 1.31 (1.00) - - - 0.86 0.86 0.82
Total Hours 1.38 (0.90) 0.99 (0.73) 0.70 (0.53) 0.85 0.81 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.91
Employment 1.00 (0.65) 0.91 (0.67) 0.68 (0.52) 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.91 0.92 0.89
Hours per Worker 0.49 (0.32) 0.25 (0.18) 0.19 (0.15) 0.74 0.40 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.58
Wages 0.91 (0.59) 0.68 (0.50) 0.62 (0.47) 0.34 0.91 0.94 0.69 0.69 0.65
Labor Productivity 0.82 (0.53) 0.80 (0.59) 0.72 (0.55) 0.45 0.70 0.92 0.57 0.66 0.62
Labor Share 0.74 (0.48) 0.64 (0.47) 0.12 (0.09) -0.08 0.09 -0.72 0.78 0.73 0.51
Vacancies 13.23 (8.59) 4.36 (3.21) 3.65 (2.79) 0.90 0.76 0.80 0.91 0.59 0.54
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Figure 3.2: Impulse response function of labor share to productivity innovation
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3.4.3 Implication on labor share
R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) first document the overshooting property of
labor share. They showed that labor share overshoots in response to productivity shocks,
and the dynamic overshooting response of labor share drastically dampens the role of
productivity shocks on labor markets due to huge wealth effects. Figure 3.3 shows the
overshooting of labor share in the baseline model. If I abstract from bargaining shocks,
the model no longer generates the overshooting of labor share. The reason the model
with bargaining shocks features the overshooting of labor share might be a direct result
of the identification strategy of bargaining shocks. Again, the fact that labor share
overshoots in the baseline model, along with other moments for labor share are almost
the same as those in actual data, justifies the assumption I pose to identify bargaining
shocks; w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw does not move much around the steady state.
More importantly, the baseline model generates the overshooting property of labor
share, but the effect of productivity shocks is still significant on labor markets in contrast
to the prediction of R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) in which the effect of
productivity shocks is dampened when labor share overshoots because of huge wealth
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effects from the overshooting property. In contrast to their model, the baseline model
has a search and matching framework, and the nature of this framework weakens wealth
effects resulting from the overshooting of labor share. On top of these differences, more
incentives for firms to hire workers offset the huge reduction of total hours in booms.
In response to positive productivity shocks output instantly increases, but employment
does not increase because of search frictions, which cause an instant drop in labor share.
As the productivity shocks today positively affect the bargaining shocks tomorrow,
ρzv = 0.3937, and as the bargaining power of existing workers increases, the firm will
have more incentives to hire marginal workers. Consequently, employment, wages, and
hours per worker will increase by offsetting an increase in outputs. This increase explains
the overshooting of labor share in response to positive productivity shocks.
3.4.4 The role of productivity shocks and bargaining shocks
Now I consider how productivity shocks and bargaining shocks differently affect the
model predictions. When the economy has only productivity shocks, z, the model
predictions are almost the same as the Andolfatto model. Comparing to the baseline
model which has both shocks, the volatility of employment, labor share, and vacancies
is dampened, but correlations between labor market variables and outputs get close to
the actual data. Auto-correlations are almost the same as the baseline case.
When the economy has only bargaining shocks, the volatility of outputs significantly
drops, which means bargaining shocks cannot be the main driving source of output
fluctuations. On the other hand, the volatility of total hours, employment, hours per
worker remarkably increases, which is far beyond the volatility in the baseline model.
Also, total hours, employment, hours per worker, and labor shares are strongly pro-
cyclical. However, auto-correlations are almost the same as the baseline case.
Table 3.8 shows the variance decomposition. Bargaining shocks have a substantial
impact on the volatility of total hours, employment, hours per worker, vacancies, and
labor share. While bargaining shocks play a remarkable role in the labor markets,
productivity shocks seem to be still the main driving force of business cycles given
productivity shocks account for about 90% of output fluctuations. This result is also
consistent with the finding in moments in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Business cycle moments in models with different shocks
σx%
(
σx
σOutput
)
ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Both Only z Only γ Both Only z Only γ Both Only z Only γ
Output 1.36 (1.00) 1.31 (1.00) 0.43 (1.00) - - - 0.86 0.82 0.91
Total Hours 0.99 (0.73) 0.70 (0.53) 0.68 (1.58) 0.81 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.91 0.91
Employment 0.91 (0.67) 0.69 (0.53) 0.60 (1.40) 0.77 0.78 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.88
Hours per Worker 0.25 (0.18) 0.19 (0.15) 0.21 (0.49) 0.40 0.54 0.45 0.56 0.58 0.57
Wages 0.68 (0.50) 0.63 (0.48) 0.43 (1.00) 0.91 0.94 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.60
Labor Productivity 0.80 (0.59) 0.72 (0.55) 0.25 (0.58) 0.70 0.92 -0.96 0.66 0.62 0.91
Labor Share 0.64 (0.47) 0.10 (0.08) 0.63 (1.47) 0.09 -0.71 0.83 0.73 0.50 0.76
Vacancies 4.36 (3.21) 3.67 (2.80) 3.23 (7.51) 0.76 0.80 0.49 0.59 0.54 0.54
Table 3.8: Variance decomposition (in percent)
Variable z ν
Output 89.69 10.31
Total Hours 48.15 51.85
Employment 58.35 41.65
Hours per Worker 9.86 90.14
Wages 68.22 31.78
Labor Productivity 90.58 9.42
Labor Share 27.44 72.56
Vacancies 52.42 47.58
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3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 Stochastic bargaining power of a marginal worker, µt
Now I assume the bargaining power of a marginal worker varies stochastically while the
bargaining power of existing workers is fixed at γ = γ = µ. Again, I identify series of
µt by using the solution to the first order differential equation, and series of the labor
share data from U.S.
(labor share)t =
µtα (1− α)
µtγ¯α
1
(−w,n)
µt =
1
γ¯α+ α(1−α)
(labor share)t(−w,n)
where w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw . Again, I assume the elasticity w,n does not move much around
the steady-state value w,n ≡ ∂w∂n nw = −µα(1−α)1−µγ¯α y¯n¯h¯w¯ . Table 3.9 shows the comparison
of business cycle moments. Stochastic bargaining power of a marginal worker cannot
quantitatively improve the Andolfatto model, even moments for labor share which is
used for identifying shock series µt.
21
3.5.2 Different calibrations for γ
I now simulate the baseline model with different values for γ = 0.3 (an example of low
values22 ), 0.5697 (a middle value and the calibrated value for the baseline model such
that µ = γ), and 0.9 (an example of high values23 ). Table 3.10 shows business cycle
moments for each case. If I set γ = 0.3, then volatility of employment and hours per
workers significantly increases than the baseline calibration case, γ = 0.5697. However,
if I set γ = 0.9, then moments are almost the same as those of the baseline calibration
case, γ = 0.5697. Mechanically, low values of γ increase the volatility of total hours,
employment, hours per worker. γ is a free parameter in this paper and there is no clear
way to pin down this parameter. However, the choice of γ = 0.5697 in the baseline
model seems innocuous and parsimonious in the sense that I think setting the same
values for the mean of bargaining powers of existing workers and bargaining powers of
new workers, γ = µ, is a reasonable given there is no information on γ, and γ = 0.5697
yields the least volatility of labor market variables among γ ∈ (0, 1).
21 This results do not change with different values of γ¯
22 In this case, the calibrated value of µ is 0.5512
23 In this case, the calibrated value of µ is 0.5956
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Table 3.9: Business cycle moments in the model: shocks on µ
σx%
(
σx
σOutput
)
ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) Shock on µ Andol. Shock on µ Andolfatto Shock on µ Andol.
Output 1.40 (1.00) 1.31 (1.00) - - 0.85 0.82
Total Hours 0.79 (0.57) 0.70 (0.53) 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91
Employment 0.76 (0.54) 0.68 (0.52) 0.82 0.78 0.89 0.89
Hours per Worker 0.19 (0.14) 0.19 (0.15) 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.58
Wages 0.62 (0.44) 0.62 (0.47) 0.94 0.94 0.68 0.65
Labor Productivity 0.73 (0.52) 0.72 (0.55) 0.91 0.92 0.63 0.62
Labor Share 0.15 (0.11) 0.12 (0.09) -0.56 -0.72 0.56 0.51
Vacancies 4.00 (2.86) 3.65 (2.79) 0.76 0.80 0.55 0.54
Table 3.10: Business cycle moments in the model with different values for γ
σx%
(
σx
σOutput
)
ρ (x,Output) ρ (xt, xt−1)
Variable (x) γ = 0.3 0.5697 0.9 0.3 0.5697 0.9 0.3 0.5697 0.9
Output 1.39 (1.00) 1.36 (1.00) 1.36 (1.00) - - - 0.86 0.86 0.86
Total Hours 1.13 (0.81) 0.99 (0.73) 0.98 (072) 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.93 0.93 0.93
Employment 1.02 (0.73) 0.91 (0.67) 0.90 (0.66) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.91 0.92 0.92
Hours per Worker 0.32 (0.23) 0.25 (0.18) 0.24 (0.18) 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.55 0.56 0.56
Wages 0.75 (0.54) 0.68 (0.50) 0.67 (0.49) 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.67 0.69 0.70
Labor Productivity 0.83 (0.60) 0.80 (0.59) 0.80 (0.59) 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.66
Labor Share 0.83 (0.60) 0.64 (0.47) 0.63 (0.46) 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.73 0.73 0.73
Vacancies 5.03 (3.62) 4.36 (3.21) 4.30 (3.16) 0.70 0.76 0.77 0.56 0.59 0.59
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies an alternative mechanism of wage negotiations in multi-worker firms
that face diminishing MPL. When Nash bargaining with a marginal worker breaks
down, a firm negotiates wages with existing workers collectively and produces with
them. The bargaining powers of existing workers are stochastic. Due to diminishing
MPL, the breakdown of the negotiation with the marginal worker negatively affects the
bargaining position of the firm with existing workers (one fewer workers) since MPL
is higher with one fewer workers. How much the firm internalizes this negative effect
depends on the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers which can be identified
through labor share data. During expansions, it is relatively difficult for the firm to hire
workers, so existing workers might have higher bargaining powers. If the firm fails to
hire a marginal worker due to a breakdown of negotiations, the firm has to pay higher
wages to existing workers in order to produce goods with them. Since the failure to
hire marginal workers is more costly during expansions, the firm has more incentives to
hire marginal workers by offering higher wages to forgo the higher cost associated with
the breakdown. During recessions, the opposite happens. Through this mechanism,
the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers provide an additional margin to
increase the volatility of labor market variables. The calibrated model generates more
volatile total hours, employment, hours per worker while labor share overshoots in
response to productivity shocks as documented in R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis
(2010). In particular, the volatility of employment in the model is similar to the actual
US data. In contrast to the prediction of R´ıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010), in
which the effect of productivity shocks is dampened when labor share overshoots due to
huge wealth effects from the overshooting property of labor share, this paper presents
a model in which the labor share overshoots in response to productivity shocks and the
volatility of employment closely matches that of US data.
In this paper, I assume the bargaining power of existing workers to be exogenous.
The quantitative results show that the time-varying bargaining power of existing work-
ers is an important margin to understand the fluctuations of total hours, employment,
hours per workers, and labor share, and the overshooting property. However, this pa-
per abstracts from the endogenous mechanism for the time-varying bargaining power of
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existing workers. Therefore, coming up with an endogenous mechanism for bargaining
shocks would be worthwhile for future research. One possible theory could be related to
the entry and exit of firms over business cycles. In booms, several firms compete with a
specific firm because of higher entry rates of new firms and lower exit rates of existing
firms, which reduce the monopolistic or bargaining power of firms over existing workers.
However, during recessions, the opposite happens. By incorporating the entry and exit
decision of firms, I might be able to explain the endogenous movements of the bargain-
ing power of existing workers. Moreover, this paper does not focus on unemployment
because the baseline model treats the unemployed and the non-employed who are out
of the labor force similarly, and the measure of unemployment is inconsistent with the
data. In this regard, I could extend the baseline model by distinguishing between the
unemployed and the non-employed to obtain a proper measure of unemployment.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Computation
A.1.1 Steady state equilibrium
In the steady state, the aggregate labor productivity is a constant. Therefore, the
measure of workers ψ does not change over time. The computational algorithm for the
steady state equilibrium is as follows:
1. Guess the market tightness θ
2. Given θ, Nash bargained wages and value functions for workers and firms can be
solved
3. Given converged value functions, stationary measures of economy can be computed
4. Compute θnew satisfies the free entry condition along with value functions for firms
and measure of the economy
κ = βq (θ (z, ψ))
∫
Ez,γ,e
[(
1− s′
)
Jx
(
γ
′
, e
′
; z
′
, ψ
′)]
I(gxs (U,γ,a,m,e;z,ψ)=1)dψ (x, U, γ, a,m, e)
5. If θ and θnew are close enough, then I found the steady state. Otherwise repeat from step 2 to
step 4 with a new guess for θ
θ = λθθ + (1− λθ) θnew
A.1.2 Equilibrium with aggregate shocks: approximated equilibrium
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Following Krusell and Smith (1998), the measure ψ is replaced with the aggregate
employment E in this paper. Therefore, the aggregate state variables in this economy
are {z, E} in stead of {z, ψ}. In order to predict the market tightness θ and the future
value for the aggregate employment E, I assume simple log-linear prediction functions
for the market tightness θ (z, E) and the aggregate employment E1 :
log (θ) = bθ,0 + bθ,1log (E) + bθ,2log (z)
log (E′) = bE,0 + bE,1log (E) + bE,2log (z)
Given the aggregate state variables {z, E} and the prediction rules, I can solve the approximated
equilibrium as follows:
1. Guess a set of coefficients in the prediction functions
b = bold ≡ (boldθ,0, boldθ,1, boldθ,2, boldE,0, boldE,1, boldE,2)
2. Given prediction rules, Nash bargained wages and value functions for workers and firms
can be solved. I linearly interpolate the value functions with respect to E
′
3. Given converged value functions, I run a simulation of 10500 periods with an artificial
series of {zt}10500t=1 in order to generate a set of series {θt, Et}10500t=1 . I can compute θt and
Et by using converged value functions in step 2, the prediction rules, and the free entry
condition.
4. Once I have the set of series {θt, Et}10500t=1 , I can update the coefficients in the prediction
functions bnew =
(
bnewθ,0 , b
new
θ,1 , b
new
θ,2 , b
new
E,0 , b
new
E,1 , b
new
E,2
)
by running OLS regressions with
{θt, Et}10500t=501. Note that I drop the first 500 observations for the regression
5. If b and bnew are close enough, then I found converged prediction functions. Otherwise
repeat from step 2 to step 4 with a new guess for b
b = λbb
old + (1− λb) bnew
6. I use R2 for the measure for accuracies of the prediction functions. The following are the
converged prediction functions and their accuracies for the baseline model:
log (θ) = 0.5340 + 0.1033 log (E) + 0.8329 log (z) , R2 = 0.9524
log (E′) = −0.0001 + 0.9993 log (E) + 0.0015log (z) , R2 = 0.9987
1 This is a simpler version of prediction functions in Bils et al. (2011)
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A.2 Graphs
Figure A.1: Recessions and recoveries in the employment rate of women since 1965
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(a) Recessions and recoveries
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(b) Recoveries
Figure A.2: Recessions and recoveries in the employment rate of men and women since
1965
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Figure A.3: Recessions and recoveries in unemployment-population ratio of men since
1965
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(a) Recessions and recoveries
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Figure A.4: Aggregate productivity during recoveries (HP-filtered)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of the equilibrium conditions
Households solve following dynamic programming problem.
V (S, sH) = max
c,s′,a′H
{u(c) + nν(1− h) + (1− n)ν(1) + βE[V (S′, s′H)]}
s.t.
c+
a′H
1 + r (S)
+ p (S) s′ = w (S, sH)nh (S, sH) + (1− n)b+ aH + [p (S) + d (S)] s− T (S)
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Ψ (S) (1− n)
S′ = G(S), c ≥ 0, No-Ponzi condition
Let λH and piH be the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraint and law of motion for
employment respectively. Then, we have the following first order conditions:
[c] u′(c)− λH = 0
[s′] βE[V ′s ]− λHp = 0
[a′H ] βE[V
′
a′H
]− λH 11+r = 0
Also, from the envelope conditions we have
VaH = λH
Vs = λH(p+ d)
By combining the first order conditions and envelope conditions, we get the following the
no-arbitrage condition between shares and bonds.
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1 = E [m′ (1 + r)]
1 = E
[
m′
(
p′ + d′
p
)]
where m′ = βuc (c′) /uc (c) is the stochastic discount factor.
Now, the representative firm solves following problem.
J(S, sF ) = max
d,k′,a′F ,v,n
′
{d+ E[m′J(S′, s′F )]}
s.t.
k′ + aF + ϕ(d, d−) = F (z, k, nh (S, sF )) + (1− δ)k − w (S, sF )nh (S, sF )− cvv + a
′
F
R (S)
ξ
(
k′ − a
′
F
1 + r (S)
)
≥ F (z, k, nh (S, sF ))
n′ = (1− χ)n+ Φ (S) v
S′ = G(S), k′, v ≥ 0
Let λ, γ, and pi be the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint, enforcement con-
straint, and law of motion for employment respectively. Then, we have the following first order
conditions.
[d] 1 + E[m′J ′d− ]− λϕd = 0
[k′] E[m′J ′k]− λ+ γξ = 0
[a′F ] E[m
′J ′aF ] + λ
1
1+r(1−τ) − γξ 11+r = 0
[v] −λcv + piΦ = 0
[n′] E[m′J ′n] = pi
Also, from the envelope conditions we have
Jk = (λ− γ)Fk + (1− δ)λ
JaF = −λ
Jn ≡ (λ− γ)zFnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E[m′J ′n]
Jd = −λϕd
By combining the first order conditions and envelope conditions, we simply get the following
first order conditions for the firm.
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1− E[m′λ′ϕ′d ] = λϕd
λcv = ΦE [m
′J ′n]
λ− γξ = E [m′ [(λ′ − γ′)F ′k + (1− δ)λ′]]
λ (1 + r)− γξR = R (1 + r)E [m′λ′]
where R = 1 + r(1− τ) is the effective gross interest rate.
B.2 Derivation of Nash bargaining solutions
Given the worker’s bargaining weight µ ∈ (0, 1), the wage and hours are solutions to the Nash
bargaining problem:
(w, h) = arg max
w,h
(
Vn
uc
)µ
(Jn)
1−µ
The first order conditions for this problem are
[w] µJn = (1− µ)λ(Vnuc )
[h]
µJn
(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− µ)Vnuc ((λ− γ)Fnh − λw)
(1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− µ)
(
Vn
uc
)
((λ− γ)Fnh − λw)(
−v(1−h)(1−h)uc + w
)
= −(1− γλ )Fnh + w
v(1−h)(1−h)
uc
=
(
1− γλ
)
Fnh
The equilibrium wage bill can be derived from the sharing rule and the definition of Vnuc and Jn.
µJn = (1− µ)λ
(
Vn
uc
)
µ((λ− γ)Fnhh− λwh+ (1− χ)E[m′J ′n]) =
(1− µ)λ
(
v(1− h)− v(1)
uc
+ (wh− b) + (1− χ−Ψ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
])
wh = µ
((
1− γ
λ
)
Fnhh
)
+ (1− µ)
(
v(1)− v(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
+
µ(1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
− (1− µ)(1− χ−Ψ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]
= µ
((
1− γ
λ
)
Fnhh
)
+ (1− µ)
(
v(1)− v(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
+
µ(1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+ µΨE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
]
− (1− µ)(1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]
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Using the sharing rule µJn = λ (1− µ) (Vn/uc) and Fnhh = Fn, along with the definition of
Vn/uc and Jn, gives the wage bill per worker:
wh = µ
[(
1− γ
λ
)
Fn + (1− χ)E
[
m′
J ′n
λ
]
+
V
1−N ΦE
[
m′
J ′n
λ′
]]
+ (1− µ)
[
ν (1)− ν (1− h)
uc
+ b− (1− χ)E
[
β
V ′n
uc
]]
B.3 Data appendix
Data for Employment, Average Weekly Hours Worked and the Labor Force are taken from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Total GDP and business GDP are taken from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economics Analysis. Real wages are
defined as labor compensation to plus labor’s share of proprietors income deflated by the GDP
deflator and divided by total hours (employment multiplied by average weekly hours). Labor
productivity is defined as total GDP divided by total hours. Vacancies are constructed using
the Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Index and the composite Help-Wanted Index by Barnichon
(2010).
Equity Payouts and Debt Repurchases are taken from the Flow of Funds published by the
Federal Reserve Board. Equity Payouts are defined as Net dividends of nonfinancial business
minus Net increase in corporate equities of nonfinancial business minus Proprietors’ net invest-
ment of nonfinancial business. Debt Repurchases are the negative of Net increase in credit
markets instruments of nonfinancial business. Both Equity payouts and Debt repurchases are
divided by business GDP from NIPA. Total GDP is used to compute the correlations reported
in Table 1.
The capital stock is constructed similar to JQ. Using the law of motion of capital
kt+1 = kt + Investment−Depreciation
we define Depreciation as Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial corporate business plus
Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial noncorporate business taken from the Flow of
Funds. Investment is measured as Capital expenditures in non financial business, also from the
Flow of Funds. Both variables are deflated by the price index for business GDP from NIPA.
The initial capital stock is chosen so that the capital-output ratio in the business sector does
not display any trend over the period 1952:Q1-2012:Q1.
The stock of debt is constructed (again, similar to JQ) using the law of motion
bet+1 = b
e
t + Net New Borrowing
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where Net New Borrowing is defined as the Net increase in credit markets instruments of non-
financial business taken from the Flow of Funds. bet+1 = bt+1/ (1 + rt) since this is the model
equivalent of the end-of-period debt reported in the data. We take the initial value of the stock
of debt to be the nonfinancial business sector’s stock of debt in 1952:Q1 from the balance sheet
data reported in the Flow of Funds. We deflate the constructed series by the price index for
business GDP from NIPA.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Marginal value of an additional employee to the firm
Jm = lim
∆→0
1
∆
[(
F (z, k, (n+ ∆)h)− w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)h− (r + δ) k − κv + βE
[
u
′
c
uc
J
[
(n+ ∆)
′]])
−
(
F (z, k, nh)− we [n]nh− (r + δ) k − κv + βE
[
u
′
c
uc
JB
[
n
′]])]
= lim
∆→0
F (z, k, (n+ ∆)h)− F (z, k, nh)
∆
− lim
∆→0
[w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)nh− we [n]nh]
∆
+E
[
β
u
′
c
uc
lim
∆→0
J [(1− χ) (n+ ∆)]− JB [(1− χ)n]
∆
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)nh− we [n]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)E
[
β
u
′
c
uc
lim
∆→0
J [(1− χ)n+ (1− χ) ∆]− JB [(1− χ)n]
(1− χ) ∆
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)nh− we [n]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
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C.1.1 Proof of proposition 1
Under we [n] = w [n+4], the equation can be rewritten as
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)h− w [n+ ∆]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]nh+ w [n+ ∆] ∆h− w [n+4]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]h+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
C.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
Under we [n] = w [n], the equation can be rewritten as
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)h− w [n]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]nh+ w [n+ ∆] ∆h− w [n]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]− w [n]
∆
nh− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]h+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− ∂w [n]
∂n
nh− w [n]h+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h− ∂w [n]
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
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C.1.3 Proof of proposition 3
Under we [n] = γw [n] + (1− γ)w [n+ ∆], the equation can be rewritten as
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] (n+ ∆)h− (γw [n] + (1− γ)w [n+ ∆])nh
∆
+
(1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]nh+ w [n+ ∆] ∆h− γw [n]nh− (1− γ)w [n+ ∆]nh
∆
+
(1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆] ∆h− γw [n]nh+ γw [n+ ∆]nh
∆
+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− lim
∆→0
w [n+ ∆]h− lim
∆→0
γ
w [n+ ∆]− ww [n]
∆
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− w [n]h− γ ∂w [n]
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
C.2 Derivation of the equilibrium conditions
Household solves the following dynamic programming problem.
Ω (S, sH) = max
c,a
′ u (c) + nu
l (1− h (S, sH)) + (1− n)ul (1) + βE
[
Ω
(
S′, s′H
)]
s.t.
c+ a′ + T (S) = w (S, sH)h (S, sH)n+ (1− n) b+ (1 + r(S)) a+ Π (S)
n′ = (1− χ)n+ p (S) (1− n)
S′ = G (S)
Let λH and µH be the Lagrange multiplier on budget constraint, and law of motion for
employment respectively. Then we have the following first order conditions.
uc = λH
E
[
βΩ′a
]
= λH
From the envelope condition with respect to a, we get
Ωa = (1 + r)λH
Taking a derivative with respect to n′, we have
µH = E
[
βΩ′n
]
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By combining equations above, we get the standard Euler equation .
E
[
β
u′c
uc
(
1 + r
′)]
= 1
Now, firms solve the following problem.
J (S, sF ) = max
v,k
Π(S) + E
[
m′
(
S, S′
)
J
(
S′, s′F
)]
= max
v,k
F (z, k, nh)− w (S, sF )h (S, sF )n− (r (S) + δ) k − κv + E
[
m′
(
S, S′
)
J
(
S′, s′F
)]
s.t.
n′ = (1− χ)n+ q (S) v
S′ = G (S)
where m′ (S, S′) = βuc (c (S′)) /uc (c (S)) is the stochastic discount factor and q (S) = M/V is
the job-filling rate.
Let µF be the Lagrange multipliers on law of motion of employment. Then, we have the
following first order conditions for firms.
κ = µF q (S)
r + δ = Fk
From the definition of the marginal value of an additional employee to the firm, the following
condition should hold.
E
[
m′Jm
′]
= µF
By combining equations above, we have an equation for the rental rate and a job creation condition.
r = Fk − δ
κ = qβE
[
m′Jm
′]
C.3 Solutions to the bargaining problem with a marginal
worker
Now, we turn to the bargaining problem which is the same as standard Nash bargaining given the
marginal value of employment for the worker and the marginal value of an additional employee
to the firm.
Ωm = wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Ωm
′
]
Jm =
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− wh− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
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Given the bargaining power of the marginal worker, µ ∈ [0, 1], and the bargaining powers
of existing workers , γ ∈ [0, 1], wages and hours per worker are determined via the following
standard bargaining problem .
(w, h) = argmax
w,h
(Ωm)µ (Jm)1−µ
= argmax
w,h
(
wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Ωm
′
])µ
×
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− wh− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
])1−µ
The first order condition with respect to w gives the following sharing rule.
µJm = (1− µ) Ωm
By plugging the definitions of Ωm and Jm, we have
µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− wh− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
])
= (1− µ)
(
wh− b+ u
l (1− h)− ul (1)
uc
+ (1− χ− p)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Ωm
′
])
It can be rewritten as
wh = µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
])
+
(1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b− (1− χ− p)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Ωm
′
])
= µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ (1− χ)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
− (1− χ− p)βE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
])
+
(1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
= µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ pβE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
])
+ (1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
= µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+ p
κ
q
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
= µ
(
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n
− γ ∂w
∂n
nh+
V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
The sharing rule, µJm = (1− µ) Ωm is used in the second line and the optimal condition for
vacancies, κ = qβE
[
m′Jm
′
]
= qβE
[
u
′
c
uc
Jm
′
]
is used in the last line.
The first order condition with respect to h gives the following intra-temporal condition for
hour per worker .
µJm
(
w − u
l
(1−h)(1− h)
uc
)
= (1− µ)Ωm
(
−∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n∂h
+ w + γ
∂w
∂n
n
)
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Since µJm = (1− µ) Ωm holds from the first order condition with respect to w,
w − u
l
(1−h)(1− h)
uc
= −∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n∂h
+ w + γ
∂w
∂n
n
ul(1−h)(1− h)
uc
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂n∂h
+ γ
∂w
∂n
n
=
∂F (z, k, nh)
∂ (nh)
+ γ
∂w
∂n
n
Following Andolfatto (1996), it is assumed that each worker is so small such that ∂F (z,k,nh)∂(nh) is
taken as given by both the worker and the firm during the bargaining.
C.4 Solutions to the first order differential equation
Given the production function and utility function, the sharing rule, the intra-temporal condi-
tion, and the wage bill can be written as
µJm = (1− µ) Ωm
φe (1− h)−η c = (1− α) zkα (nh)−α
wh = µ
(
(1− α) zkαh1−αn−α − γ ∂w
∂n
nh+
V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul (1)− ul (1− h)
uc
+ b
)
We can rewrite the wage bill as the first order differential equation as follows.
µγnh
∂w
∂n
+ hw = µ
(
(1− α) zkαh1−αn−α + V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)
∂w
∂n
+
1
µγn
w =
1
µγnh
(
µ
(
(1− α) zkαh1−αn−α + V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
))
So, the integrating factor is
e
∫
( 1µγn )dn = e
1
µγ ln(n) = n
1
µγ
By multiplying both sides of the equation by n
1
µγ and integrating both sides with respect to n,
we have
w = n
− 1
µγ
∫
n
1
µγ
1
µγnh
×[
µ
(
(1− α) zkαh1−αn−α + V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
)]
dn+Dn
− 1
µγ
= n
− 1
µγ
∫
n
1
µγ
1
µγnh
×[
µ
(
(1− α) zkαh−αn−α)+ µ( V
1−N κ+
(1− µ)
µ
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
))]
dn+Dn
− 1
µγ
= n
− 1
µγ
[
µ (1− α)
1− µγα zk
αh−αn−α+
1
µγ + n
1
µγ
µ
h
(
V
1−N κ+
(1− µ)
µ
(
ul(1)− ul(1− h)
uc
+ b
))]
+
Dn
− 1
µγ
=
µ (1− α)
1− µγα zk
αh−αn−α +
µ
h
(
V
1−N κ+
(1− µ)
µ
(
v(1)− v(1− h)
uc
+ b
))
+Dn
− 1
µγ
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where D is a constant of the integration of the homogeneous equation. By assuming the
total wage bill wnh has to remain finite as employment becomes small as in Hawkins (2011) or
alternatively by assuming limn→0 wnh = 0 as in Cahuc, Maroque, and Wasmer (2008), we have
D = 0. From the equation above, we also have
∂w
∂n
= −µα (1− α)
1− µγα zk
αh−αn−α−1 < 0
C.5 Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by the following conditions under functional forms
specified in the calibration section.
E
[
β
C
C′
(
1 + r′
)]
= 1
r = Fk − δ = α Y
K
− δ
N
′
= (1− χ)N + ωV ψ (1−N)1−ψ
q = ωV ψ−1 (1−N)1−ψ
Y = C + I + κV
I = K
′ − (1− δ)K
Y = F (z,K,Nh) = ezKα (Nh)1−α
κ
q
= E
[
β
C
C′
[
(1− α) Y
′
N ′
− w′h′ + µα (1− α)
1− µγα
Y
′
N ′
+ (1− χ) κ
Φ′
]]
φe (1− h)−η C = (1− α) Y
Nh
wh = µ
(
(1− α)Fn + V
1−N κ
)
+ (1− µ)
((
φe
1
1− η − φe
(1− h)1−η
1− η
)
C + b
)
+
µα (1− α)
1− µγα Fn
C.6 Data appendix
C.6.1 Raw data
1. Employment, Average Weekly Hours Worked, Population: Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
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2. Real GDP, GDP, Compensation of Employees, Proprietors Income, GDP deflator: Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economics Anal-
ysis. (BEA)
3. Vacancies: Conference Board’s Help Wanted Index and the Composite Help Wanted Index
by Barnichon (2010)
4. Consumption of Fixed Capital, Capital Expenditure in non-financial non-corporate busi-
ness: Flow of Funds
C.6.2 Constructed data
1. Employment =
Employment
Population
2. Hours per Worker =
Average Weekly Hours Worked
20×5
3. Total Hours = Employment × Hours per Worker
4. Labor Share =
Compensation of Employees
GDP-Proprietors Income
5. Real Wage = Labor Share×Real GDP
Tolal Hours
6. Labor Productivity = Real GDP
Tolal Hours
7. Vacancies = Conference Board’s Help Wanted Index and the Composite Help Wanted
Index by Barnichon (2010)
8. Investment = Capital Expenditure deflated by GDP deflator
9. Depreciation = Consumption of Fixed Capital deflated by GDP deflator
10. Capital Stock is constructed by the perpetual inventory method using follow law of motion
kt+1 = kt + Investment−Depreciation
Initial capital stock is chosen so that the capital-output ratio does not display any trend
over the period 1960Q1-2012Q1.
